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GUNSMOKE AND LEGAL MIRRORS: 
WOMEN SURVIVING INTIMATE BATTERY AND 
DEADLY LEGAL DOCTRINES 
 
Judith E. Koons* 
Gunsmoke trail. 
Oh tell me of days gone by. 
- Theme from Gunsmoke⊥ 
 
[Y]ou wanna control. 
I mean, that’s where the hitting comes from. 
To put fear in ‘em. 
- Participant in Batterers’ Intervention Program± 
 
We do not ask of the man in the barroom brawl 
that he leave the bar before the occurrence of an anticipated fight, 
but we do ask the battered woman threatened with a gun why she 
did not leave the relationship. 
- V. F. Nourse§ 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law, Orlando, 
Florida. B.A., J.D. University of Florida, M.T.S. Harvard Divinity School. 
Copyright, Judith E. Koons, 2006. I am indebted to the faculty and staff of the 
law library, particularly Ann Pascoe, for their patient expertise, to Professor 
Mark Summers for his generous collegiality, to Melissa Martin for her helpful 
research assistance, and to Barry University School of Law for its manifold 
support of my work. 
 ⊥ REX KOURY & GLENN J. SPENCER, THEME FROM GUNSMOKE (Herman 
Music, Inc. 1955). 
 ± Julia T. Wood, Monsters and Victims: Male Felons’ Accounts of Intimate 
Partner Violence, 21 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 564 (2004) (reporting 
accounts of intimate partner violence and how the accounts draw upon 
understandings of codes of manhood). 
 § V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238 
(2001) [hereinafter Nourse, Subjectivity]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a prototypical plot of the1960s television series 
“Gunsmoke,” Miss Kitty is defending herself against a homicidal 
bandit while Marshall Dillon deputizes the men of the town.1 In 
2005— and in true Gunsmoke-ethos—Florida fortified the castle 
doctrine’s privilege in which people are permitted to use deadly 
force in their homes without retreating.2 
Supported by an unprecedented system of presumptions 
justifying the use of deadly force, as well as immunities from 
criminal and civil actions where force is used as authorized, the act 
abrogated the common law duty to retreat outside of a dwelling.3 
                                                          
1 E.g., Gunsmoke: Help Me Kitty (featuring Miss Kitty’s shooting a 
stagecoach bandit in self-defense) (CBS television broadcast Nov. 7, 1964) 
(episode guide), at http://www.tv.com/gunsmoke/show/236/episode_guide. 
html&season’10 (last visited July 20, 2005); Gunsmoke: Uncle Finney 
(depicting an attempted robbery that is thwarted by Festus, acting as Matt 
Dillon’s deputy) (CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 1968). Set in Dodge City, 
Kansas, in 1873, Gunsmoke aired from 1955-1975 and starred James Arness as 
Marshall Matt Dillon, Amanda Blake as Kitty Russell, Milburn Stone as Doc 
Adams, Dennis Weaver as Chester Goode, and Ken Curtis as Festus Haggen. 
The (New) Network and Cable TV Guide, Gunsmoke, at 
http://www.geocities.com/TelevisionCity/9348/gunsmoke.htm?200528 (last 
visited Jul. 27, 2005). 
2 See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005); see also Rick Neale, 
“Deadly Force” Law Draws Mixed Views, FL. TODAY, Apr. 28, 2005, available 
at http:www.floridatoday.com (last visited May 30, 2005) (referring to statement 
of Peter Gunn, spokesperson of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, 
that Florida’s act operates to deputize its entire citizenry). For a discussion of the 
history of the castle doctrine, see infra Part II. For a review of Florida’s 
codification of the castle doctrine, see infra Part III. 
3 Florida joined a number of states that have abrogated the duty to retreat 
outside of a dwelling, but was the first state to adopt a system of statutory 
presumptions justifying the use of deadly force and immunities from civil action 
and criminal prosecution where force is used as authorized. See S.B. 436, 107th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(1), which establishes a 
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm to justify deadly force against 
a person who is unlawfully and forcefully entering a dwelling or occupied 
vehicle, and creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032, which provides immunity from 
criminal prosecution and civil action where force is used as outlined in the 
statute); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle 
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At the same time, the statutory re-casting of the castle doctrine left 
intact ambiguities in the law that effectively place a duty to retreat 
on women who live with battering men.4 The re-working of the 
castle doctrine gives occasion for the broader project of this 
article—to study gender contradictions in the construction of legal 
doctrines.5 
                                                          
Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 663 (2003) (advising that 
“[m]ost jurisdictions do not impose the duty to retreat on one who is unlawfully 
attacked, whether in public or private space.”). For an overview of the duty to 
retreat in the United States, see Part II, infra. For a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
analysis of the retreat doctrine, see infra note 41. For a discussion of the duty to 
retreat in Florida, see infra Part III. 
4 That the Florida legislature was not considering the circumstances of 
women who live with battering men is apparent by the bill’s granting a 
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm in situations of unlawful entry 
into a residence (or classic stranger violence that is commonly experienced by 
men), not where a person is being battered by a co-resident who is lawfully on 
the premises (or classic intimate partner violence that is commonly experienced 
by women). See, e.g., Ronet Bachman & Linda Saltzman, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 3 (Aug. 
1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/femvied.pdf 
[hereinafter Bachman & Saltzman] (reporting findings of the National Crime 
Victimization Survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Justice, including results that “[m]en were about twice as likely as women to 
experience acts of violence by strangers” while “women were about 6 times 
more likely to experience violence committed by an intimate.”). Furthermore, 
the act asserts a standard of imminence (i.e., deadly force is justified where 
necessary to prevent imminent death, great bodily harm, or to prevent the 
imminent commission of forcible felony). S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 
2005) (amending ‘ 776.012). Imminence has been critiqued as a porous standard 
that has operated to the disadvantage of women who kill battering men. Nourse, 
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1237, 1282. For further discussion of the act, see 
Part III, infra. For further discussion of the standard of imminence, see Parts 
V.A. & C., infra. 
5 This article highlights the Florida act to examine the construction of the 
law (and gender inequity in the law). I have previously situated my work within 
a feminist history of ideas and construction of thought. See Judith E. Koons, 
Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality, The Pro-Marriage Moral Discourse of 
American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Koons, 
Motherhood] (utilizing a critical genealogical approach to inspect the social, 
theological, and historical tracks of four sets of values (good mother / bad 
mother, deserving / undeserving, independent / dependent, and legitimate / 
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A key lobbyist for the National Rifle Association (the “NRA”) 
characterized the emboldened castle doctrine as the “first step of a 
multi-state strategy” to introduce similar legislation across the 
country.6 Citing plans to begin “dropping bills” in capitals, the 
NRA’s Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre advised, “We 
will go everywhere, red states and blue states, including New 
York. It is both a liberty and a crime issue with a big political 
tailwind. Politicians are putting their career in jeopardy if they 
oppose this type of bill.”7 
                                                          
illegitimate) in the moral discourse of contemporary welfare policy); FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS: A POLEMIC 16 (Walter Kaufmann 
& R. J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1887) (developing a 
critical genealogical approach to question “where our good and evil really 
originated.”) (emphasis in original); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY 
OF PRACTICE 168-69 (1977) (proposing that outside of the universe of orthodoxy 
and heterodoxy (or “right” opinion and “left” or “wrong” opinion), is the doxa, 
which is the “universe of the undiscussed” (the class of that which is beyond 
question and taken for granted) and that the truth of doxa is only revealed when 
critique “brings the undiscussed into discussion.”); see also Nancy Fraser & 
Linda Gordon, The Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. 
Welfare State, 19 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 309, 310 (1994) 
(reconstructing the genealogy of dependency) reprinted in BARBARA LANSLETT, 
ET AL., RETHINKING THE POLITICAL 36 (1995); CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY 
DELIVERANCE: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 48 (1st ed. 
1982) (seeking, in a non-reductive historiography, the “‘moment of arising’ of 
the idea of white supremacy within the modern discourse in the West”); Nourse, 
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1293 (adopting an intellectual method of 
constitutive feminist inquiry to ask how the law “constitutes us and our 
relationship to the political order.”). Cf. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 92 
(Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992) (1854) (while “burrowing” his cabin on the hillside 
of Walden and suggesting that “our lives must be stripped,” Thoreau advised us 
to “work and wedge our feet down through the mud and slush of opinion, and 
prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and appearances, that alluvium which 
covers the globe . . . .”). 
6 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Fla. Gun Law to Expand Leeway for Self-Defense, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at A01; see also Jacqui Goddard, Florida Boosts 
Gun Rights, Igniting a Debate, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 10, 2005, at 
2 (noting that the NRA chose Florida to launch this gun initiative and hopes to 
take the campaign nationwide). 
7 Andrew Metz, NRA Axiom Now Fla. Law, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 2005, at 
A27 (also reporting that the NRA plans to target “at least 29 states, including 
New York, that have laws with specific retreat requirements.”). 
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Although proponents contended that “[d]isorder and chaos are 
always held in check by the law-abiding citizen,”8 critics asserted 
that the act is a dangerous return to the Wild West.9 Some 
observers described the political impulse behind the act as “a 
perverse exploitation of a politician’s fear of appearing soft on 
crime,”10 while others proposed that the “emotionally manipulative 
measure” merely codifies pre-existing rights to self-defense.11 
While echoing many of the foregoing general criticisms, this 
article sets up a hermeneutic12 of inclusive conversation13 to 
                                                          
8 Roig-Franzia, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting House sponsor Dennis Baxley 
(R. Ocala)). 
9 Marc Caputo & Gary Fineout, Deadly Force Bill Passes House, MIAMI 
HERALD, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1; see also Goddard, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting 
opponent who fears the measure will promote vigilantism and “turn Florida into 
the O.K. Corral.”). 
10 Metz, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting Richard Aborn, president of New 
Yorkers Against Gun Violence). The Florida House of Representatives voted 94 
to 20 in favor of the bill; the Florida Senate passed it on a vote of 39 to 0. Abby 
Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18. 
11 Daniel Ruth, You Talkin’ To Me?, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 22, 2005, at 2. 
At first glance, it may seem that the Florida legislature merely shored up pre-
existing law. However, the legislature endowed the castle doctrine with a novel 
system of presumptions and immunities, creating a “castle doctrine on steroids.” 
For further discussion of the presumptions and immunities adopted by the act, 
see infra Part II. 
12 In a narrow sense, hermeneutics refers to the interpretation of written 
texts. E.g., DONALD K. MCKIM, WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGICAL 
TERMS 127 (1996) [hereinafter WESTMINSTER] (defining hermeneutics in terms 
of searching for meanings of writings, particularly biblical texts). Broadly 
speaking, however, hermeneutics is understood as the “art of understanding.” 
Bernard C. Lategan, Hermeneutics, in ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY 149 (David 
Noel Freedman ed., 1992) (also observing that hermeneutics includes the name 
of “Hermes,” the messenger of the gods and the inventor of speech and writing). 
For an elaboration on the theoretical basis for the hermeneutical enterprise, see 
infra Part IV. 
13 Social ethicist Ralph B. Potter, Professor Emeritus of Harvard Divinity 
School, developed the framework of inclusive conversation to encourage full 
moral deliberation in public and interpersonal discourse. See Ralph B. Potter, 
Reunion Day 4 (1980) (unpublished manuscript, McCormick Theological 
Seminary, Chicago, IL., on file with the author) [hereinafter Potter 1980]; see 
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examine gender distortions in the law’s construction of the retreat 
and castle doctrines. For, while women who have been battered in 
their homes14 and who must then fight for their lives in a criminal 
justice system that is structured with inhospitable legal doctrines, 
people (mostly men) have been given license to carry concealed 
weapons15 and expanded legal protections for the use of deadly 
force in the public domain.16 Given the human wreckage created 
by domestic violence,17 the discriminatory effects of the gender 
                                                          
also Judith E. Koons, Making Peace With Difference: A Hermeneutic of 
Inclusive Conversation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Koons, 
Making Peace] (adapting Potter’s approach to construct an interdisciplinary 
critical and constructive hermeneutic for evaluating the “problem” and the 
“potentiality” of difference). Also known as “Potter’s Boxes,” the methodology 
seeks to ensure that the critical dimensions of our existence (the natural order, 
self, society, and ultimate reality) are included in moral deliberation. Id. at 20. 
This article adapts Potter’s Boxes to examine the experiences of women who 
live with battering men and key doctrines that structure the criminal justice 
system for women who kill battering men. For a discussion of Potter’s Boxes, 
see infra Part IV. 
14 Approximately three-fourths of women who experience intimate violent 
report that the offense occurred at or near their homes. Lawrence A. Greenfeld 
et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes 
by Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends 11 (1998), available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf (also stating that women are five 
to eight times more likely than men to be victimized by an intimate partner) 
[hereinafter Greenfeld]; see also Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 1 
(advising that about seventy-five percent of “lone-offender” violence against 
women was carried out by an offender known to the victim and that twenty-nine 
percent of violence against women was perpetrated by an intimate partner). 
15 See Fla. Stat. ‘ 790.06 (2005). In the wake of Florida’s adoption of a 
mandatory conceal-carry licensing act in 1987, one million licenses were issued. 
Lee Nessel Daszuta, Sticking to their Guns, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 25, 2005. 
16 Most men are assaulted and killed outside their homes by strangers, but 
most women are assaulted and killed within their homes by male partners. 
Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills 
a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 320 
(1996). Of the 341,974 current conceal-carry gun licenses held in the state, 
approximately eighty-five percent are issued to men. See Daszuta, supra note 
15, at 4 (also quoting the statements of Marion Hammer, NRA spokesperson, 
that the NRA “fought for seven years” to pass the law and, after it was vetoed by 
Governor Graham in 1986, “we elected a new governor and passed it again.”). 
17 Considerable attention has been paid by feminist scholars to the use of 
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the terms “domestic violence,” “spouse abuse,” and “battered women.” E.g., 
Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1295, 1299 n. 9 (1993) (noting dissatisfaction with the terminology, as 
“domestic violence” is inaccurately gender-neutral and trivializes the criminality 
of the behavior, while “battered woman” connotes weakness, passivity, or 
abnormality); see also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to 
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1191, 1204 (1993) (advising that the terms “spouse abuse,” “domestic 
violence”, “marital assault,” “woman abuse,” and “battering” are, in the 
scientific field, used interchangeably to refer to the broad range of behaviors 
considered to be violent and abusive within an intimate relationship). 
The phrases “domestic violence” and “spouse abuse” have been challenged as 
connoting an inappropriate gender symmetry. E.g., Margaret Thornton, 
Feminism and the Contradictions of Law Reform, 19 INT’L J. SOC. L. 453, 460 
(1991) (proposing that “spouse abuse” suggests a non-existent neutrality and 
that “domestic violence” also disguises which sex is responsible for the 
preponderance of the battering). A recent Department of Justice study shows 
that about three-fourths of the victims of family violence were women and that 
three-fourths of the persons who perpetrated family violence were male. 
Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Family Violence Statistics (June 
2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs02.pdf (also stating 
that women were eighty-four percent of spouse abuse victims and eighty-six 
percent of victims of intimate abuse). 
Furthermore, the term “battered women” has been critiqued as “reductive,” by 
implying that the total experience of a woman is limited to being battered. 
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 61 
(2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, LAWMAKING]. Cf. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., 
“Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special 
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. 
L. REV. 409, 534 (1997) (reporting that terminology has been a “sensitive issue” 
for people with disabilities: they have strongly insisted that “we are people 
first,” and have demanded that their common humanity be acknowledged rather 
than their differences magnified”). 
The clear gender asymmetry of “domestic violence” warrants gender-specific 
language, and the prevalence of abuse by intimate male partners mandates 
attention to the intimate relationship. Consequently, while recognizing that, for 
practical purposes, the terms overlap and are often synonymous, the article will 
privilege the term “women who live with battering men” to recognize the 
gender-specificity and intimate relational basis of “domestic violence.” Martha 
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) (recounting the resistance of some 
women to apply the term ‘‘battered woman” to themselves” and noting that, at 
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incongruities are particularly lethal. 
Following this Introduction, Part I of the article offers a 
summary of justifiable homicide and related doctrines, including 
the duty to retreat, the requirement of imminence, as well as the 
privilege of non-retreat that is reflected in the castle doctrine. Part 
II reviews the legal context of Florida’s codification of the castle 
doctrine. Part III outlines the elements of a hermeneutic of 
inclusive conversation while Part IV unfolds the hermeneutic to 
interrogate the disjuncture between the framework of the law of 
self-defense and the experiential reality of women who live with 
(and sometimes kill)18 battering men. 
                                                          
one conference, several women described themselves with the phrase ‘‘a woman 
who used to be married to a battering man”). 
18 In 1992, it was estimated that 800 to 1,000 of the women who were 
battered each year were charged with the murder of abusive partners. Erich P. 
Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered 
Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 n.16 (1992) [hereinafter Andersen 
& Read-Andersen]. Between 1993 and 2001, an intimate partner killed about 
thirty-three percent of female murder victims and four percent of male murder 
victims. Callie Marie Rennison, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Intimate Partner 
Violence, 1993-2001, (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (reporting, in a Department of 
Justice study, that 1,247 women and 440 men were killed by an intimate partner 
in 2000 and that 1,581 women and 708 men were killed by an intimate partner in 
1993). 
In this article, I articulate a feminist critique of the doctrines structuring the law 
of self-defense as applied to women who kill battering men. The article should 
not be considered an apology for vigilantism or an exercise in victimism. 
BELINDA MORRISSEY, WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY AND 
SUBJECTIVITY 25 (2003) (proposing that female killers are depicted as victims, 
insane, or monsters and defining “victimism” as the portrayal of people who 
have been abused as incapable of acting due to prior abuse); see also Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 486 (1996) 
[hereinafter Schneider, Equality] (arguing that the circumstances of women who 
kill battering men “are critical junctures for the intersection of law and social 
attitudes because they trigger a national chord of anxiety about ‘‘abuse excuse’ 
justice and ‘‘feminazi’ vigilantism.”). The article does not assert that claims of 
self-defense are appropriate for all women who kill battering men. Schneider, 
Equality, supra. 
At the same time, I recognize some staggering statistics. At least seventy percent 
of women who kill intimate partners do so during an ongoing attack or where 
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I. NECESSITY AND JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: OF “TRUE MEN” AND 
“HONORABLE MEN” 
Justification rests on considerations of necessity and 
proportionality.19 In considering claims of justifiable homicide, 
                                                          
there is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Holly Maguigan, 
Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current 
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 382, 384, 397-99, & nn.68-75 
(1991) (concluding, in a study of 223 homicide cases defended by women who 
were battered, that seventy-five percent of women were killed during 
confrontations with their partners, and also offering sources for data that 
between seventy and ninety percent of intimate homicides by women were 
victim-precipitated). Furthermore, nearly fifty percent of women are in prison 
for killing a relative or intimate, almost sixty percent of female inmates in state 
prisons have experienced physical or sexual abuse, and over half of the female 
inmates who have been abused were sentenced for homicide crimes. Tracy L. 
Snell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Women in Prison 3, 6 (1991), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wopris.htm; Lawrence Greenfeld & Tracy 
A. Snell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Women Offenders 1 (1999), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/worpris.pdf (stating, in a Department of 
Justice study, that almost six in ten women in state prisons had experienced past 
abuse). 
While urging care in the interpretation of such statistics, some psychiatrists offer 
the Freudian concept of repetition compulsion, whereby people who are 
traumatized find themselves reenacting aspects of previous trauma. JUDITH 
LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 40-41, 74-75, 110-12 (1992) (also 
noting commonalities in the effects of trauma experienced by hostages, 
survivors of war, political prisoners, slaves, survivors of child abuse, and 
women who have been battered); see also Daniella Levine, Children in Violent 
Homes: Effects and Responses, 68 FLA. BAR J. 62, 63 (Oct. 1994) (advising that 
seventy-three percent of men in a batterers’ study reported having been 
physically or sexually abused as children). A concern raised by some feminist 
scholars is that the law constructs women as victims, erasing their agency, or as 
rational agents, denying their defenses. E.g., Schneider, Equality, supra at 499; 
see also WESTMINSTER, supra note 12, at 178 (defining moral agency in terms 
of the capability of humans to carry out ethical actions). However, the curious 
congruence of women killing most often during assaults as well as women 
killing who have been previously victimized affirms that victimization and 
agency are not opposed, but are as profoundly related for women who kill 
battering men as are notions of oppression and resistance. Schneider, Equality, 
supra at 523. 
19 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 86-88 (1984) (advising 
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courts have read several rules into necessity, including variations 
of a duty to retreat as well as a requirement that deadly force only 
be used when an attack (or harm) is imminent.20 Principles of 
retreat and imminence have particular salience in cases in which 
women claim justifiable homicide of battering men. As a predicate 
to considering the gender implications of retreat and imminence 
rules that act as “translators” of necessity, this section of the article 
traces the legal development of those doctrines.21 
Prior to Bracton, the common law did not recognize defenses 
to homicide.22 A person killing by accident, while insane, or in 
self-defense was sentenced to the gallows, subject only to a 
reprieve by a king’s pardon.23 Where the jury relayed one of the 
foregoing circumstances to the king, a pardon was generally 
                                                          
that “[a]ll justification defenses have the same internal structure: triggering 
conditions permit a necessary and proportional response”). 
20 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill 
Their Batterers, 71 N.C.L. REV. 371, 380-81 (proposing that imminence 
“operates as a condition precedent for a finding of necessity”); Nourse, 
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1236 (arguing imminence “often operates as a 
proxy for any number of other self-defense factors—for example, strength of 
threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE 
AND COMMENTARIES, pt. 1, MPC 3.04 cmt. at 53 (1985) (stating that “[t]here is 
a sense in which a duty to retreat may be regarded as a logical derivative of the 
underlying justifying principle of self-defense: belief in the necessity of the 
protective action”). 
21 Rosen, supra note 20, at 381 (characterizing imminence as a “translator” 
of necessity). 
22 MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 1063 (4th ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter GARDNER & SINGER]. Bracton was a legal treatise (circa 1230) that 
was named for a royal judge, Henri de Bracton (d. 1268). It was the first legal 
treatise in Anglo-American law that developed constitutional and legal theory. 
DANIEL CONQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 61-2, 88-92 
(1999) (discussing and quoting excerpts of BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne trans., George E. Woodbine ed. 
1968) (1230)). 
23 GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1063; see also Eugene R. 
Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What 
They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 775-76 (2004) (noting that 
Bracton’s concept of criminal intent later served as the basis for acquittal for 
accident, madness, and immaturity). 
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granted.24 At the beginning of the 15th century, these circumstances 
became grounds for acquittal and for pardons that were issued as a 
matter of course.25 Forfeiture to the king of all land and chattel of a 
defendant remained a prerequisite to a pardon.26 In 1532, 
Parliament adopted a statute that characterized killings as 
“justifiable” when committed by persons to prevent felonies or by 
victims who suffered unprovoked deadly attacks on highways or in 
homes.27 While an “excusable” killing required forfeiture of land 
and chattel, “justifiable” homicide did not.28 
By the time of Blackstone, homicide that was committed to 
prevent “any forcible and atrocious crime” was justifiable by the 
laws of nature and those of England.29 A person committing 
justifiable homicide was found to be completely without fault.30 In 
contrast, homicide in self-defense was viewed as excusable, rather 
than justifiable.31 A person committing excusable homicide was 
                                                          
24 GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1063. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (referring to 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532) (Eng.)). 
28 Id. For a discussion of the theories underlying justification and excuse, 
see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 205-19 (3d ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING]. 
29 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *179-80, available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-414.htm [hereinafter 
BLACKSTONE]; see also MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 3.02 cmt. 1 (1985) (proposing 
that, although there were issues as to definition and extent, “necessity seems 
clearly to have standing as a common law defense.”). 
30 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *179-80; see also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 2 
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 181 (15th ed. 1994) [hereinafter WHARTON’S]. 
31 Blackstone contrasted justifiable homicide to hinder the perpetration of a 
capital crime and excusable homicide in self-defense “or se defendendo, upon a 
sudden affray . . . whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the 
like, in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults 
him.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *183-84 (referring to excusable homicide 
in self-defense as “chance-medley” or casual affray and “chaud-medley” or 
affray in the heat of blood or passion). While noting Blackstone’s “two-headed” 
version of self-defense, criminal law scholars have differed in their 
interpretations, mostly surrounding the necessity of retreat. Nourse, Subjectivity, 
supra note §, at 1244, n.50. Some feminist scholars have argued that the law of 
self-defense developed “with an underlying gender bias” that rendered it unable 
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found to be at some fault and to receive some degree of 
punishment.32 
Retreat “to the wall” was required of a person who killed 
another in excusable self-defense.33 No retreat was required in the 
case of justifiable homicide.34 When the practice of forfeiture came 
to an end in the early 19th century, legal scholars merged justifiable 
prevention of a felony into killing in self-defense and required 
retreat even in cases that had previously been considered to be 
justifiable.35 
Americans were “loath to retreat.”36 In the 1800s, no-retreat 
                                                          
to deal justly with women who kill abusive men. Developments in the Law—
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1575-76 
(1993) [hereinafter Developments] (characterizing the development of self-
defense doctrine with two paradigms in mind—a sudden attack by a stranger or 
intruder and a dispute between two persons of equal size and strength). 
32 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *183-84; see also WHARTON’S, supra 
note 30, at 225. 
33 “The law requires that the person, who kills another in his own defense, 
should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the 
violence of the assault, before he turns upon his assailant. . . . The party 
assaulted must therefore flee as far as he conveniently can, either by reason of 
some wall ditch, or other impediment. . . . “ BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 
*183-84; see also Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1244, n.50 (arguing that, 
to Blackstone, retreat was required only where there was “fault” for entering the 
fray). The phrase “retreat to the wall” finds its origin in an early English case in 
which the defendant had been driven to a wall between two houses, beyond 
which he was not able to pass; there he stood and killed the other in self-defense. 
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1070 (referring to FITZHERBERT, GRAND 
ABRIDGMENT, C. and P.C. No. 284 (1328)). Fitzherbert was a judge of the 
Common Pleas from 1522-1538 and a “writer of the highest authority.” Sykes v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, 3 All Eng. Rep. 33 (House of Lords 1961). 
34 GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1069 (noting that “the fully 
innocent target of an unprovoked attack could stand his ground and kill”). 
35 Id; see also WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 181 (citing 3 STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 11, 77 (1883)) (advising that the 
penalty of forfeiture was abolished in 1828). 
36 Stephen P. Aggergaard, Case Note, Retreat from Reason: How 
Minnesota’s New No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Cries for Alteration, 
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 659 (2002) (reciting George Washington’s 
scolding of Major General Charles Lee for “an unnecessary, disorderly, and 
shameful retreat” during the Battle of Momouth in the Revolutionary War); see 
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rules became common in the Colonies and the Midwest.37 An 1876 
Ohio Supreme Court decision advised that “a true man, who is 
without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by 
violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him 
enormous bodily harm.”38 However, retreat was more commonly 
required in the Northeast and the South.39 In 1903, Harvard 
Professor Joseph Beale articulated the premises for the rule of 
retreat: 
A really honorable man, a man of truly refined and elevated 
feeling, would perhaps always regret the apparent 
cowardice of retreat, but he would regret ten times more, 
after the excitement of a contest was past, the thought that 
he had the blood of a fellow-being on his hands. It is 
undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten times more 
disgraceful to kill.40 
One hundred years later, state law reflects the division between 
the “true man” privilege of non-retreat and the “honorable man” 
duty of retreat to avoid deadly confrontation.41 
                                                          
also L.S. Rogers, Annotation, Homicide: Extent of Premises Which May be 
Defended Without Retreat Under Right of Self-Defense, 52 A.L.R.2D 1458 
(1957) (noting a “general revulsion in America to so unnatural a standard of 
conduct” of retreating from an assailant). 
37 Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 659-60; see also Susan Estrich, Defending 
Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1431-32 (1990) (arguing self-defense rules 
exist not so much to define manly behavior as to limit manly instincts—in order 
to preserve human life). 
38 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (Ohio 1876); see also Runyan 
v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877) (contrasting the “ancient doctrine” of retreat with 
the “weight of modern authority” to meet force with force when a person is 
violently assaulted). The United States Supreme Court cited both decisions with 
approval in Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560-62 (1895) (holding that 
the lower court erred in ruling that the accused, while on his premises outside of 
his residence, was under a legal duty to retreat). 
39 Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 660. 
40 Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. 
REV. 567, 581 (1903). 
41 Compare Carpenter, supra note 3, at 663 (stating “[m]ost jurisdictions do 
not impose the duty to retreat on one who is unlawfully attacked, whether in 
public or private space”) with Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 661-62 (2002) 
(proposing, as of 2002, that nineteen jurisdictions generally do not require 
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retreat, twenty-nine jurisdictions “have resisted the stand-your-ground ethos” 
and require retreat, and three jurisdictions “claim a ‘middle ground’ that shuns a 
categorical duty to retreat but still scrutinizes the defender’s behavior.”); see 
also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING , supra note 28, at 226 n.36 (noting the 
“current trend appears to favor movement away from the no-retreat requirement 
rule.”). 
Research indicates that twenty-two jurisdictions could fairly be considered to 
require a defendant to retreat prior to using deadly force, where retreat can be 
done in complete safety. Alabama: ALA. CODE ‘ 13A-3-23 (2005); Alaska: 
ALASKA STAT. ‘ 11.81.335 (2005); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. ‘ 5-2-607 
(2005); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT ‘ 53a-19 (2005); Delaware: DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, ‘ 464 (2005); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ‘ 703-304 (2004); Iowa: 
IOWA CODE ‘ 704.3 (2003); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, ‘ 108 (2005); 
Maryland: Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (Md. 1997) (“One of the elements 
of the defense of self-defense is the duty of the defendant to retreat or avoid 
danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his safety.”); 
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Gagne, 326 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Mass. 1975) 
(“[T]he defendant recognizes that we follow the rule that a person attacked with 
deadly force must retreat whenever it is possible to do so in safety”); see also 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 696 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Mass. 1998) (“The right of 
self-defense does not accrue to a person until he has availed all proper means to 
avoid physical combat. Thus, if a defendant has an opportunity to retreat but 
fails to do so, the defendant has no privilege to use force in self-defense.”); 
Minnesota: State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Mn. 1999); Missouri: 
State v. Jordan, 646 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Mo. 1983); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ‘ 
28-1409 (2005); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 627:4 (2005); New 
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. ‘ 2C:3-4 (West 2005); see also State v. Gartland, 694 
A.2d 564, 571 (N.J. 1997) (noting statutory duty to retreat and commending to 
the legislature “consideration of the application of the retreat doctrine in the case 
of a spouse battered in her own home.”); New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW ‘ 35.15 
(McKinney 2005); North Carolina: State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 335 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“The duty to retreat requires a victim of an assault to 
retreat to the wall before using deadly force in self-defense.”); North Dakota: 
N.D. CENT. CODE ‘ 12.1-05-07 (2005); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ‘ 2901.05 
(West 2005); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. STAT. ANN. ‘ 505 (2005); Rhode Island: 
State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995); South Carolina: State v. Long, 
480 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 1997) (“To establish self-defense, a defendant must 
establish . . . he has no other probable means of avoiding the danger. However, a 
person attacked on his own premises, without fault, has the right to claim 
immunity from the law of retreat.”). 
Research also indicates that twenty-one jurisdictions could fairly be considered 
not to impose a duty to retreat before a defendant may resort to deadly force. 
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 13-411 (2004) (“B. There is no duty to retreat 
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before threatening or using deadly physical force justified by subsection A of 
this section.”). See also State v. Korzep, 799 P.2d 831 (Ariz. 1990); California: 
People v. Collins, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); People v. 
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (citing jury instruction); Colorado: COLO. 
REV. STAT. ‘ 18-1-704 (2004); Harris v. People, 75 P. 427 (Colo. 1904); People 
v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 348 (Colo. 2001); Florida: FLA. STAT. ‘ 776.012 (2005) 
(effective Oct. 1, 2005); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. ‘ 16-3-21 (2004); Johnson v. 
State, 315 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. 1984); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. ‘ 18-4009 (2005); 
State v. McGreevey, 105 P. 1047, 1051 (Idaho 1909); Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/7-1 (2005); People v. Bush, 111 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1953); People v. 
Rodriguez, 543 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. ‘ 
35-41-3-2 (LexisNexis 2004); Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 745-746 (Ind. 1895); 
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. ‘ 21-3211 (2005); State v. Scobee, 748 P.2d 862 
(Kan. 1988); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 503.050 (West 2004); Sikes v. 
Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Ky. 1947); Mississippi: MISS. CODE 
ANN. ‘ 97-3-15 (2005); Haynes v. State, 451 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1984); Cook v. 
State, 467 So. 2d 203, 211 n.7 (Miss. 1985); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. ‘ 45-
3-102 (2004); State v. Merk, 164 P.655, 658 (Mont. 1917); Nevada: NEV. REV. 
STAT. ‘ 200.120 (2004); State v. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 375 (1872) (decision under 
former similar statute); Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000); New Mexico: 
N.M. U.J.I. CR. 14-5190 (2005) (jury instruction states, in part: “A person who 
is threatened with an attack need not retreat. In the exercise of his right of self 
defense, he may stand his ground and defend himself.”); Oklahoma: Neal v. 
State, 597 P.2d 334, 337 (Ok. Crim. App. 1979) (“The law in Oklahoma is clear: 
There is no duty to retreat if one is threatened with bodily harm.”); Tennessee: 
TENN. CODE ANN. ‘ 39-11-611 (2005) (“(a) . . . [t]here is no duty to retreat 
before a person threatens or uses force.”); State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701 
(Tenn. 1995) (“Under the ‘true man’ doctrine, one need not retreat from the 
threatened attack of another even though one may safely do so; neither must one 
pause and consider whether a reasonable person might think it possible to safely 
flee rather than to attack and disable or kill the assailant.”); Utah: UTAH CODE 
ANN. ‘ 76-2-402 (2005) (“(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the 
force or threatened force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that 
person has lawfully entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection 
(2)(c)” (pertaining to aggressors and combat by agreement)); State v. Mares, 192 
P.2d 861 (Utah 1948); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ‘ 2305 (2004); State v. 
Hatcher, 706 A.2d 429, 435 (Vt. 1997); Virginia: McCoy v. Commonwealth, 99 
S.E. 644, 645 (Va. 1919); Washington: State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 
(Wash. 1984); West Virginia: State v. Crawford, 66 S.E. 110, 113 (W. Va. 
1909). 
Research indicates that eight jurisdictions may be considered to occupy a 
“middle ground,” in which retreat is a factor in determining whether deadly 
force is justified. District of Columbia: United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 
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The Model Penal Code articulates the rule of retreat, as 
follows: “The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . if . . . the 
actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force 
                                                          
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973) (“Before a person can avail 
himself of the plea of self-defense against the charge of homicide, he must do 
everything in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and 
avoid the necessity of taking life.”); Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002 
(D.C. 1986) (“The middle ground approach to self-defense imposes no duty to 
retreat, but it permits the jury to consider whether a defendant, if he safely could 
have avoided further encounter by stepping back or walking away, was actually 
or apparently in imminent danger of bodily harm. In short, this rule permits the 
jury to determine if the defendant acted too hastily, was too quick to pull the 
trigger.”); Louisiana: State v. Brown, 414 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. 1982) 
(“Although there is not an unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is 
a recognized factor in determining whether or not a defendant had the 
reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger.”); 
Michigan: People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 39 (Mich. 2002) (“An accused’s 
conduct in failing to retreat, or to otherwise avoid the intended harm, may in 
some circumstances, other than those in which the accused is the victim of a 
sudden violent attack, indicate a lack of reasonableness or necessity in resorting 
to deadly force in self-defense.”); Oregon: State v. Charles, 647 P.2d 897, 903 
(Or. 1982) (“This court has never laid down an absolute rule endorsing either 
‘retreat’ or ‘no retreat’ as the rule in Oregon . . . The duty has depended on the 
threat posed and the facts of each case.”); South Dakota: Compare State v. 
Stumbaugh, 132 N.W. 666, 674 (S.D. 1911) (“The law, as stated in the old law 
books, is that the person assaulted must retreat to the wall or ditch, meaning, of 
course, he must go as far as he can with safety, before he would be justified in 
taking the life of his assailant.”), overruled on other grounds, State v. Waff, 373 
N.W.2d 18, 22 (S.D. 1985), with State v. Wilcox, 204 N.W. 369, 373 (S.D. 
1925) (“[H]e was not obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he could safely 
retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground. . . .”); Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. ‘ 9.32 (Vernon 2004) (“ (a) A person is justified in using deadly force . . . 
(2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated . . . “); 
Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), rev. 
denied, 599 N.W. 2d 409 (Wis. 1999) (“While Wisconsin has no statutory duty 
to retreat, whether the opportunity to retreat was available may be a 
consideration regarding whether the defendant reasonably believed the force 
used was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.”); Wyoming: 
Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wyo. 1983) (“Prior to resorting to deadly 
force, a defendant has a duty to pursue reasonable alternatives under the 
circumstances. Among those reasonable alternatives may be the duty to 
retreat.”). 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
 INTIMATE BATTERY AND THE LAW 633 
with complete safety by retreating. . . .”42 Some legal scholars have 
questioned whether, in the era of the firearm,43 a defender can ever 
avoid using deadly force “with complete safety” and whether the 
Code has only “paid homage to the retreat requirement, while 
allowing virtually every defendant to stand her ground.”44 
Of the jurisdictions that have adopted a duty of retreat, most of 
them also recognize the “castle doctrine,” which provides an 
exception to the retreat rule and authorizes the use of deadly force 
by a person who is protecting her home and its inhabitants from 
attack.45 The castle doctrine harkens back to the feudal precept that 
                                                          
42 Section 3.04(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Penal Code states: “The use of deadly 
force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force 
is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping 
or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if . . . (ii) 
the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with 
complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a 
person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he 
abstain from any action that he has no duty to take . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 
3.04(2)(b)(ii) at 31 (1985). The Model Penal Code places the use of defensive 
force against felonious attack within “a single rule, not varied when the case is 
viewed as one of self-defense or one of crime prevention.” Id. cmt. at 38. 
Consequently, the Code disavows justification for the use of force “in the 
absence of belief by the actor in its necessity for the protective purpose he 
attempts to serve.” Id. 
43 The .50 caliber rifle, available on the civilian market, is able to 
“penetrate light armor, down helicopters, destroy commercial aircraft, and blast 
through rail cars and bulk storage tanks filled with explosive or toxic 
chemicals,”all from a mile away. Tom Diaz, Clear and Present Danger 
(Violence Policy Center), June 2005, at iii, available at 
http:www.vpc.org/studies/50danger.pdf; see also .50 Caliber Danger (NBC 
Dateline television broadcast June 19, 2005). 
44 GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1070-71. 
45 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (7th ed. 1999). One articulation of the 
castle doctrine provides: “[T]hose who are unlawfully attacked in their homes 
have no duty to retreat, because their home offers them the safety and security 
that retreat is intended to provide. They may lawfully stand ground instead and 
use deadly force if necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury, 
or the commission of a forcible felony.” Carpenter, supra note 3, at 656-57 & 
n.12 (concluding that this statement of the castle doctrine “merges traditional 
notions of the defense of habitation and self-defense in the home.”). Carpenter 
also argues that, rather than providing a “settled exception to the generalized 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
634 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
an “Englishman’s home is his castle.”46 In 1895, the United States 
Supreme Court endorsed the principle, advising that the “weight of 
modern authority . . . establishes the doctrine that, when a person, 
being without fault and in a place where he has a right to be, is 
violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by 
force. . . .”47 In expressing the sentiment underlying the doctrine, 
Judge Cardozo insisted: 
It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed 
in his own dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he 
may stand his ground and resist the attack. He is under no 
duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from 
his own home.48 
The Model Penal Code recognizes other exceptions to the duty 
to retreat. Neither a person attacked at her place of work, nor a 
public officer engaged in the performance of duties, nor a person 
justified in using force to make an arrest or prevent an escape is 
required to retreat.49 Some state legislative bodies have recently 
enacted “Make-My-Day,” “Shoot-the-Burglar,” and “Shoot-the-
Carjacker” laws.50 The latter justifies a homicide committed 
                                                          
duty to retreat, the Castle Doctrine has evolved into a confusing patchwork of 
rules.” Id. at 657. 
46 R. v. Southwark London Borough Council, [2002] EWHC 153 (Q.B. 
2002) (referring to Sendil’s Case [1585] 7 Co. Rep. 6a and quoting Semayne’s 
Case [1604] 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b as follows: “The house of every one is to him 
as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as 
for his repose.”); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 4:223 (“And the law 
of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s 
house, that it stiles is his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with 
impunity). 
47 Beard, 158 U.S. at 562 (noting the accused was where he had a right to 
be, to wit: “on his own premises, constituting a part of his residence at home, at 
the time the deceased approached him in a threatening manner. . . . “). 
48 People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914); see also Weiand v. 
State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1050 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 
824, 827 (Fla. 1965) for the proposition that “[w]hen in his home he has 
‘retreated to the wall’”). 
49 MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 3.04 cmt. at 52-3 (1985). 
50 In 1985, Colorado adopted a defense of habitation act, also known as the 
“Make-My-Day” law, in which deadly force is justified against a person making 
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against a person who is attempting to make unlawful entry into a 
vehicle if the actor reasonably believes that deadly force is 
“necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to 
leave.”51 Under this Louisiana statute, there is no stated 
requirement that the defender either be in danger or believe that 
she is in danger of receiving injury.52 
On the privilege of non-retreat in the home, courts have 
endorsed varying views regarding the applicability of the privilege 
to co-occupants and invited guests.53 In recapitulating a duty to 
                                                          
an unlawful entry and committing a crime in a dwelling where the occupant 
“reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no 
matter how slight, against any occupant.” See COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1-704.5(2)-
(4) (2004) (also providing immunity from criminal prosecution and civil 
liability); see also People v. Janes, 982 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1987) (affirming 
reversal of a manslaughter conviction where the instruction regarding 
defendant’s “Make-My-Day” defense failed to explain that the state effectively 
had to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt). Louisiana 
adopted a defense of habitation law, also known as the “Shoot-the-Burglar” act, 
in 1982. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (1983) (creating the crime of 
“unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling” without a specific intent 
requirement); see also John S. Baker, Jr., Criminal Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 279, 
288-89 (1983) (critiquing the act and proposing that the measure was a 
legislative reaction to judicial reversal of burglary convictions). In the “Shoot-
the-Carjacker” law, Louisiana expanded the defense of premises to automobiles. 
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (2004); see also Stephanie Grace, 
Carjacker Law Debated as Too Much, Too Little, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 
1997, at A1 (discussing legal and political changes effected by the act and 
reporting the debate as a “political Rorschach test”). For a discussion of these 
legislative elaborations of the defense of premises doctrine, see Stuart P. Green, 
Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in 
Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1999). For a 
discussion of the traditional defense of habitation, see MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 
3.06 & cmt. at 91 (1985) (noting limitations on the use of deadly force in 
defense of premises). 
51 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (2004) (also revising the “imminent 
danger” standard to “reasonable belief” and eliminating the duty to retreat). 
52 Green, supra note 50, at 3. 
53 While noting a split among the state courts, an annotation advises that a 
majority of courts that have adopted the castle doctrine also considers the 
“principle equally applicable when the assailant is a cohabitant.” Linda A. 
Sharp, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and Assailed 
Share the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R.5TH 637 (1999). However, a number 
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retreat and adopting the cohabitant exception to the castle doctrine, 
some courts have recognized the policy that two people who share 
a residence have “equal rights to be in the ‘castle’” and neither has 
the right to eject the other.54 
Related to the duty to retreat is imminence. As commonly 
formulated, to claim self-defense to a charge of homicide, a 
defendant must reasonably believe “that he is in imminent danger 
of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm.”55 Unlike the duty 
to retreat, which has an earlier common law lineage, the 
requirement of imminence began to be expressed in the late 
eighteenth century.56 
To support the element of imminence in self-defense, the 
perceived danger need not be actual.57 The defendant must have a 
reasonable belief that she is in danger, which is not justified unless 
                                                          
of cases reach a contrary result and distinguish an encounter between two 
occupants from an encounter between an occupant and an intruder, reasoning 
that “since both the assailed and the assailant are on common ground and neither 
has the right to eject the other, the person assailed is under a duty to retreat 
before killing the assailant.” Id. (identifying nine jurisdictions that affirm a 
common law or statutory duty to retreat for cohabitants: District of Columbia, 
Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina); see also Weiand v. State, 732 
So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (citing Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and West Virginia as 
requiring retreat of cohabitants at the time of its decision in State v. Bobbitt, 415 
So. 2d 724 (1982)). 
54 E.g., State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726, overruled by Weiand, 732 So. 
2d at 1044; see also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 657-58 (discussing the policies 
underlying the debate over the castle doctrine’s applicability to cohabitants and 
invitees). 
55 Rosen, supra note 20, at 378; see also WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 
181 (providing the following standard: “A defendant may kill in self-defense 
when he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of losing his life or 
suffering great bodily harm.”); DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 
222 (noting that imminence is an aspect of the necessity component of self-
defense). 
56 Blackstone advised that self-defense arose only in cases that were 
“sudden and violent . . . when certain and immediate suffering would be the 
consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 
29, at 4:14; see also Rosen, supra note 20, at 387 n.45. 
57 WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 181. 
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some act has been performed that manifests an intent to expose the 
defendant to such danger.58 In cases in which a defendant 
reasonably anticipates that the other person intends to kill her, 
many courts require the defendant to wait until an act is performed 
that indicates that the homicidal attack is imminent.59 In cases in 
which the danger has ceased to exist, such as where an assailant 
has abandoned an attack, a defendant cannot claim justifiable 
killing.60 
On this historic template, Supreme Courts of several states, 
including Florida, have recently grappled with the consequences 
for victims of domestic violence of the duty to retreat that is 
imbricated in the cohabitor exception to the castle doctrine.61 As 
will be discussed in the following section, the Florida legislature 
could have bolstered the law’s resolve for the safety of women 
who live with battering men.62 Instead, the legislature focused on 
strengthening  the castle doctrine for men carrying concealed 
                                                          
58 Id. at 184. 
59 Id. at 188. The Model Penal Code states as follows: “[T]he use of force 
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such 
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the 
use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE ‘ 3.04(1) (1985); see also Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 
1242 (advising that, by shifting the focus from the threat to the response 
(“immediately necessary”), the Model Penal Code attempted to soften the notion 
that “the time for defense is now. The defender cannot wait any longer”). 
60 WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 190. 
61 E.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (receding from 
imposing on cohabitants a duty to retreat from the residence and adopting a 
limited duty to retreat within the residence); State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 
1343 (Ohio 1997) (finding error in an instruction that a cohabitant assailant had 
a duty to retreat and noting in cases of domestic violence that survivors had 
already “retreated to the wall” many times); State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564 
(N.J. 1997) (requiring tailored instruction on statutory duty to retreat for 
cohabitants); see also State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001) 
(adopting a rule of non-retreat for co-occupants, but placing the absence of a 
duty to retreat within an obligation to act reasonably and ruling that the trial 
court’s instruction was harmless error). 
62 For discussion of the use of the phrase “women who live with battering 
men,” see supra note 17. 
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weapons on the street.63 
II. GUNSMOKE OVER THE SUNSHINE STATE 
Two major policy steps were taken in Florida prior to 
refashioning the castle doctrine. The first measure, adopted in 
1987, was a statewide conceal-carry gun licensure act.64 Concealed 
weapons laws fall into two categories: discretionary (or “may 
issue”) systems in which licenses are granted only to citizens who 
establish a compelling need to carry a gun and non-discretionary 
(or “shall issue”) licensing systems in which authorities must 
provide a license to any applicant who meets stated criteria.65 In 
1985, the NRA announced it would lobby for “shall issue” laws in 
specified states.66 Florida was one of the first states to move from a 
“may issue” to a “shall issue” law, rendering its conceal-carry 
system among the most permissive in the nation.67 
Since the enactment of the law, one million concealed weapon 
licenses have been issued in the state; 341,974 of those licenses 
                                                          
63 See Angel, supra note 16, at 320 (arguing the duty of retreat for co-
occupants disadvantages women because most women are assaulted and killed 
within their homes by intimate male partners, while most men are assaulted and 
killed outside their homes by strangers); Daszuta, supra note 15, at 4 (reporting 
that approximately eighty-five percent of the current conceal-carry licenses in 
Florida are issued to men). 
64 See FLA. STAT. ‘ 790.06 (2005). The legislature found it necessary to 
regulate “concealed weapons or firearms for self-defense to ensure that no 
honest, law-abiding person who qualifies under the provisions of this section is 
subjectively or arbitrarily denied his or her rights.” FLA. STAT. ‘ 790.06(15) 
(also directing that the section be liberally construed “to carry out the 
constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense”); see also Daszuta, supra note 
15, at 4 (discussing the NRA’s seven-year battle to pass the act, the veto by 
Governor Graham in 1986, the re-adoption of the bill in 1987, and its signing by 
a new Governor in 1987). 
65 David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on 
Homicide in Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 193-94 (1995) 
[hereinafter McDowall]. 
66 Id. 
67 Id; see also George Volsky, Guns in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
1987, at 26 (reporting that the law, “one of the most liberal in the country,” 
would be watched closely to see if there is any effect on crime statistics). 
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were valid as of March 31, 2005.68 Before the enactment of the 
law, 16,000 persons in the state had licenses to carry guns.69 
Florida’s law became the blueprint for dozens of states to pass 
similar laws and ignited the debate over concealed weapons as a 
deterrent for violent crime.70 
The second measure came in 1999 when the state Supreme 
Court modified the duty to retreat from a residence before deadly 
                                                          
68 Daszuta, supra note 15, at 4. 
69 Myra MacPherson, Pistol-Packin’ Populace: Florida Up in Arms, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1987, at E1. 
70 Goddard, supra note 6, at 2. But see Richard Getchell, Comment, 
Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform 
Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 751, 752 (1987) (noting the new act was “expressly intended as a self-
defense bill, not as a deterrent.”). A study of the frequency of firearm homicides 
in the urban areas of Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon resulted in two 
conclusions: the stronger conclusion that “shall issue” laws do not reduce 
homicides and the weaker conclusion that “shall issue” laws raise levels of 
firearms murders. McDowall, supra note 65, at 202-03. But see Ryan S. Andrus, 
The Concealed Handgun Debate and the Need for State-to-State Concealed 
Handgun Reciprocity, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2000) (discussing the 
major empirical studies that support and oppose the proposition that concealed 
handguns deter crime and concluding that existing research provides “little 
support” for the fears of opponents); see also MacPherson, supra note 69, at 6 
(proposing that the “strongest argument” for controlling handgun sales arises 
from comparing the U.S. murder rate with that of countries that have highly 
restrictive handgun laws: “A 1986 study of cities of comparable size showed 67 
handgun murders in London, 1,582 in New York.”). Compare U.S. v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (interpreting the Second Amendment as relating to the 
preservation or efficiency of an organized state militia), with U.S. v. Emerson, 
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.W. 907 (2002) (holding that 
the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals “to privately possess 
and bear their own firearms”); Robert J. Spitzer, The Second Amendment “Right 
to Bear Arms” and United States v. Emerson, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 19 
(2003) (proposing that the Supreme Court (in Miller) and “over forty lower 
court rulings are correct in embracing the collective or militia view of the 
amendment. The Emerson majority . . . fails to dislodge the formers’ reasoning 
or conclusions.”). Despite others’ misgivings about the validity of Emerson, 
then-Attorney General Ashcroft embraced Emerson as “the policy of the Justice 
Department” and directed all ninety-three United States Attorneys to adopt 
Emerson as the law of the United States. Id. at 2 n.4. 
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force may be used against a co-occupant.71 From 1982 to 1999, 
Florida had followed a rule of retreat in co-occupant cases, 
reasoning that the castle doctrine did not apply because cohabiting 
spouses had equal rights to occupy the residence.72 In Weiand v. 
State, the court receded from requiring a full retreat from the 
premises prior to using deadly force in self-defense.73 Two reasons 
were cited by the court to sustain this conclusion. First, the court 
characterized earlier precedent as having been “grounded upon the 
sanctity of property and possessory rights, rather than the sanctity 
of human life.”74 Second, the court recognized that “imposing a 
duty to retreat from the residence has a potentially damaging effect 
on victims of domestic violence claiming self-defense.”75 
However, to satisfy any concern that eliminating a duty to 
retreat might “invite violence,” the court adopted a limited duty to 
retreat within the residence where reasonably possible without 
increasing the danger of death or great bodily harm.76 The court 
also determined that it was inappropriate to distinguish between 
victims of domestic violence and other defendants who were 
                                                          
71 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1056-57 (Fla. 1999). Kathleen Weiand 
was convicted of second-degree murder in the killing of her husband, Todd, who 
had beaten and choked her during their three-year relationship. Id. at 1048. 
During the pendency of her appeal to the Supreme Court and after serving four 
years in prison, she was granted executive clemency. Id. at 1047; Sue Carlton, 
Battered Spouse Case is Closed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at 1B. 
72 Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726 (reasoning the cohabitants “had equal rights to 
be in the ‘castle’ and neither had the legal right to eject the other.”). 
73 Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1051 (adopting Justice Overton’s dissent in 
Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726). 
74 Id. at 1052. 
75 Id. at 1051. 
76 Id. at 1056. While asserting that “the availability of the nonretreat 
instruction does not ‘invite’ violence,” the court adopted a “middle ground” 
instruction to satisfy “any concern that eliminating a duty to retreat might invite 
violence.” Id. (noting a lack of empirical data that demonstrated any correlation 
between eliminating the duty to retreat from the home and an increase in 
domestic violence). Cf. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS 197 (1935) (“Political problems drive pure moralists to despair because 
in them the freedom of the spirit must come to terms with the contingencies of 
nature, the moral ideal must find a proper mechanism for its incarnation, and the 
ideal principle must be sacrificed to guarantee its partial realization.”). 
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attacked in a residence by a co-occupant.77 
It was in this legal context in 2005 that the Governor signed 
into law the new statutory right to stand one’s ground outside of a 
dwelling, residence, or automobile and “meet force with force” 
where a person “reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to 
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another 
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.”78 Where a 
person against whom defensive force is used was unlawfully and 
forcefully entering (or had entered) a dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle, the act creates a presumption of fear of death or 
great bodily harm for the defender using deadly force.79 However, 
                                                          
77 Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1057. The impetus for the court’s reconsideration 
of Bobbitt was “our increased knowledge of the complexities of domestic 
violence.” Id. However, the court also determined not to distinguish between 
cotenants and invitees. Id. (adopting a broad reading of the position advanced by 
Justice Overton’s dissent in Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726). 
78 S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 
776.013(3), referring to “[a] person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and 
who is attacked in [a place other than a dwelling, residence, or vehicle] where he 
or she has a right to be”). This section of the statute, among others, reflects 
apparent gender distortion, in that men are generally assaulted and killed outside 
their homes by strangers, but women are generally assaulted and killed in their 
homes by male partners. Angel, supra note 16, at 320. 
79 S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 
776.013(1)(a)). The staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the 
presumptions created by the act “appear to be conclusive,” not rebuttable. STAFF 
OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS 
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 6 (Feb. 25, 2005). “Dwelling” is defined as 
a “building or conveyance of any kind . . . designed to be occupied by people 
lodging therein at night.” S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating 
Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(5)(a)). “Residence” is a “dwelling in which a person resides 
either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.” Id. (creating 
Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(5)(b)). With these definitions, in a case where a man has 
been invited to a woman’s home on one occasion and thereafter becomes 
abusive, a woman may not be able to claim the benefit of the presumption. The 
breadth of the definitions may even lead courts to consider a man in such a 
circumstance to be a lawful resident. Cf. State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 n.3 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the trial judge’s response to the claim for 
extension of the castle doctrine to a man who had been in an apartment on two 
occasions, once for consensual sex: “I expect home to be where you hang your 
hat and in this case, as I understand it, the defendant was doing more than 
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the presumption is unavailing where the person against whom 
force is used “has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the 
dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such an owner, lessee, or 
titleholder.”80 By disallowing the presumption for cohabitants, the 
legislative scheme significantly disfavors women who live with 
battering men.81 
Furthermore, the act provides for immunity from criminal and 
civil actions that arise out of the justifiable use of deadly force.82 In 
a criminal investigation, law enforcement officers are prohibited 
from arresting the person using force unless there is probable cause 
to believe that unlawful force was employed.83 In a civil action 
successfully defended by a person who is immune from 
prosecution, the court is required to order attorney’s fees, costs, 
compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred in 
defense of the action.84 
In reviewing the act’s abrogation of the common law duty to 
retreat before a person may resort to deadly force, legislative staff 
analyses noted some confusion regarding the duty to retreat.85 
                                                          
hanging his hat; he was hanging his pants. So, I think he has the right to the 
same kind of protection in that home.”). 
80 See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 
776.013(2)(A)). 
81 Most violence toward women comes from cohabiting male partners. E.g., 
Angel, supra note 16, at 320. The legislation only addresses women who live 
with battering men in those limited cases where the women have obtained 
injunctions for protection or no-contact orders. See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(2)(A)). (providing that the 
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm does not apply where the 
person against whom defensive force is used is a lawful resident and where 
“there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written 
pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person.”). Presumably, 
where a person enters a dwelling in violation of an injunction for protection or 
an order of no contact, the presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm 
would apply, not because of the behavior of the perpetrator, but because of the 
unlawfulness of the entry, given the court orders. 
82 Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(1)).. 
83 Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(2)). 
84 Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(3)). 
85 The Senate Staff of the Judiciary Committee noted that the bill abrogates 
the common law duty to retreat. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 
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More significantly, however, the act purported to eliminate the 
duty to retreat only where the presumptions of fear of death or 
great bodily harm are operable or where the harm is imminent.86 
Women who live with battering men are caught on both prongs of 
the statute.  First, the favorable presumptions are unavailing to 
women who live with battering men because the presumptions 
contemplate stranger violence (through unlawful entry), rather than 
violence at the hands of intimate partners.87  Second, the standard 
of imminence effectively functions as a retreat rule. While retreat 
rules invite juries to consider why defendants did not leave, the 
                                                          
107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
STATEMENT 5-7 (Feb. 25, 2005) (stating, too, that “a person will no longer have 
any duty to retreat, unless the person is not in a place where he or she is lawfully 
entitled to be.”). The analysis also suggested that, by cross-referencing the 
section on self-defense in a dwelling, residence, or vehicle that does not speak to 
a duty to retreat, the committee substitute is “somewhat confusing in the way 
that the Florida common law duty to retreat is completely abrogated.” Id. at 7-8. 
The Senate Staff of the Criminal Justice Committee proposed that the 
“elimination of the duty to retreat will arguably effectively extend the ‘castle 
doctrine’ to anyone who is an invited guest (i.e., has the right to be at the 
location) and could create confusion with regard to whose right to be in a 
particular location is paramount for the purposes of justifiable use of force.” 
STAFF OF SENATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE 
STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 7 (Feb. 10, 2005). 
86 One section of the statute was amended to state, in pertinent part: 
“However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a 
duty to retreat only if: (A) He or she reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself 
or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony; or (B) 
Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013.” S.B. 436, 107th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (amending Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.012). Another section 
described as pertaining to “use of force in defense of others” was amended to 
state: “However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or 
she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent 
commission of a forcible felony. A person does not have a duty to retreat if the 
person is in a place where he or she has a right to be.” Id. (amending Fla. Stat. ‘ 
776.031). 
87 See,e.g., Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting findings of a 
Department of Justice study that men were more likely to encounter violence by 
strangers, while women were much more likely to face violence by intimate 
partners). 
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requirement of imminence encourages  juries to ask the same 
question, although in a temporal form—whether defendants had 
the time to leave.88 Consequently, by asserting a standard of 
imminence, the legislature adopted a “silent retreat rule,” taking 
back what it claimed to disavow.89 
What effect do principles such as imminence and retreat have 
on women who live with battering men—and on their standing in 
the criminal justice system when they kill their abusers? The article 
will answer those questions by engaging a hermeneutic of 
inclusive conversation, the theoretical basis of which is discussed 
in the following section. 
III. A HERMENEUTIC OF INCLUSIVE CONVERSATION: POTTER’S 
BOXES 
In its narrow frame of reference, hermeneutics is defined as 
“the rules one uses for searching out the meaning of writings.”90 In 
a broader sense, hermeneutics goes beyond textual interpretation to 
                                                          
88 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1267-68. 
89 Id. at 1281-82 (observing that imminence operates as a silent retreat rule, 
even in states that have rejected retreat). For a discussion of imminence as a 
species of retreat, see infra Parts IV.A. & C. 
90 WESTMINSTER, supra note 12, at 127; see also Elisabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza, Feminist Hermeneutics, in THE ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY 783, 785 
(David Noel Freeman ed., 1992) (advising that the term Ahermeneutics” is 
derived from the Greek word hermeneuein / hermeneia, defined as “the practice 
and theory of interpretation.”). Distinctions have been traditionally drawn 
between general philosophical hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics as well as 
between specialized forms of hermeneutics such as legal and theological 
hermeneutics. Lategan, supra note 12, at 149-50 (noting that a hermeneutics of 
jurisprudence—reflected in modernity as modes of interpreting statutes—arose 
out of a revival of interest in Roman Law in the 12th century). More recently, 
legal scholars are looking to philosophical hermeneutics to deepen legal 
hermeneutical analysis. See, e.g., Ioannis S. Papadopoulos & Mark Tushnet, 
Legal Hermeneutics at a Crossroads: Giuseppe Zaccaria’s Questioni di 
Interretazione, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 261 (2000) (proposing 
Zaccaria’s work as a bridge between American legal thought and philosophical 
hermeneutics); Francis J. Mootz III, Review Essay: The New Legal 
Hermeneutics, 47 VAND. L. REV. 115 (1994) (reviewing GREGORY LEYH, LEGAL 
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (1992)). 
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“refer to one’s means or ways of interpreting and construing the 
meaning of experience.”91 Closely related is a hermeneutic, which 
is defined as “the lens or perspective or set of assumptions through 
which experience is processed, or through which life is ‘read.’”92 
Against a backdrop of key legal doctrines, this article uses a 
hermeneutic of inclusive conversation to read the experiences of 
women who live with and kill abusive male partners. The 
methodology is an adaptation of a hermeneutic for moral 
deliberation known as “Potter’s Boxes” that was developed by 
Harvard social ethicist Ralph B. Potter.93 
Potter’s Boxes begin with an inquiry into the adequacy of our 
moral discourse.94 According to Potter, to be adequate, a moral 
discourse must enable us to speak about the four critical 
dimensions of our existence: the natural order, self, society, and 
ultimate reality.95 The first dimension, which also corresponds to 
                                                          
91 CHARLES R. FOSTER & THEODORE BRELSFORD, WE ARE THE CHURCH 
TOGETHER: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CONGREGATIONAL LIFE 166 (1996). 
92 Id. at 163. 
93 See Potter 1980, supra note 13; see also Ralph B. Potter, Colloquium in 
Ethics (Sept. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Potter 1989] (unpublished collection) (on 
file with the author); Ralph B. Potter, Qualms of a Believer, 69 SOUNDINGS 111 
(1986) [hereinafter Potter 1986]; Ralph B. Potter, Justice and Beyond in Moral 
Education, 19 ANDOVER NEWTON Q. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Potter 1979]. This 
schema was adapted by Potter from the work of Harvard sociologist Talcott 
Parsons, whose social systems theory envisioned the domains of life as 
functionally interrelated. Potter 1989, supra. Feminist sociologist Miriam 
Johnson offered a feminist reappraisal of the work of Talcott Parsons. Miriam 
M. Johnson, Feminism and the Theories of Talcott Parsons, in FEMINISM AND 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 101 (Ruth A. Wallace ed., 1989) (focusing on the “fit” 
between feminism and Parsons’ theory of social progress). I have previously 
emphasized the multidimensional and interdisciplinary methodology at the heart 
of Parsons’ work as bearing fruit for feminist scholarship. Koons, Making 
Peace, supra note 13, at 20, n.93. 
94 The description of Potter’s Boxes was drawn from Koons, Making 
Peace, supra note 13, at 19-22. 
95 Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 112-13. These four domains relate to the 
four functional prerequisites of Parsons’ social system analysis: adaptation, goal 
attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance. Potter 1989, supra note 
93. Potter translated the Parsonsian functions into moral considerations as 
follows: 
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the first of four domains of Potter’s Boxes, orients toward the facts 
of a situation and relates us to the natural order through empirical 
disciplines. Utilitarianism is an example of a moral language that 
arises from this quadrant. The second domain centers on loyalties 
and imparts a psychological account of self, relationships, and 
community. Communitarianism is a representative moral language 
from this domain. The third domain highlights norms and 
expresses a political philosophy of what is a just society. Moral 
languages reflecting this domain are Deontology and Rights-Based 
Justice. The fourth domain inquires into meaning and questions the 
purpose of life and the terms of our human existence. Illustrative 
moral languages located in this domain are from Religious or 
Philosophical Traditions.96 
To Potter, each domain may be seen as employing a different 
moral language that represents one of the four major orientations to 
life.97 In Potter’s view, each language is distinctive by virtue of 
having “its own logic, criteria of adequacy, prospect of criticism, 
and possibility of ‘improvement.’”98 
At heart, Potter’s Boxes reject any methodology that would 
privilege one of the four moral languages or that would seek to 
create another moral “first language” as the vehicle for considering 
                                                          
First, an adequate moral language must relate us to the natural order 
through ‘economic’ and ‘ecological’ doctrines. Second, it must provide 
a psychological account of how a stable sense of self is created and 
maintained. Third, it must yield a political philosophy guiding our 
reconstruction of a just and sustainable society. Fourth, it must express 
a common sense of what life is about and, ultimately, the terms of our 
human existence. 
Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 113. 
96 Id. Two moral languages which are often considered the foundation of 
our Western legal system are Utilitarianism and Deontology. The relational 
domain has been the locus of feminist critiques of rights-based justice. E.g., 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and of 
Morality, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 481 (1977). 
97 In Qualms of a Believer, Potter presented examples of utilitarian 
individualism, expressive individualism, the civic republican tradition, and the 
biblical tradition. Potter 1986, supra note 93. 
98 Potter 1979, supra note 93, at 147. 
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aspects of the common life.99 Potter insisted that a significant 
problem of moral adequacy arises when one of these languages is 
advanced as a first language, seeking to serve as the basis for 
adjudicating all questions of the common life.100 Potter argued that 
each perspective is incomplete, by offering a skewed moral 
vocabulary and only a partial vision for public discourse.101 
In Potter’s understanding, a full moral deliberation necessarily 
includes each of the moral languages.102 Each language privileges 
certain considerations and also flags areas of concern when those 
considerations are offended. Consequently, a full moral 
deliberation among interlocutors may include comments such as 
the following: 
‘You don’t have the facts straight,’ ‘You have failed to take 
into account the welfare of certain persons who deserve 
consideration,’ ‘You have neglected a variety of relevant 
                                                          
99 Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 114 (critiquing ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., 
HABITS OF THE HEART (1985) as posing civic republicanism as a moral first 
language). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. Potter’s Boxes may be used in the classroom as the basis for a 
critical self-reflective process that also brings stories of people and 
considerations of meaning into equal partnership with the facts and norms. 
Potter’s Boxes offers a way to talk about and across issues of race, gender, and 
class. For example, when discussing racism and white privilege in jurisprudence 
classes, I invite students to identify the considerations that they are privileging, 
to sharpen or modify their moral commitments, to diagnose the considerations 
that are being privileged by others in the conversation, and to assess the factors 
that are being overlooked in the conversation. Potter’s Boxes helps some 
students to see that they may be privileging a short-term historical perspective 
and a norm of individual responsibility, while other students may be taking a 
longer-term historical perspective, emphasizing the effect of racism on people, 
or probing the structural causes of racism. Potter’s Boxes also has potential for 
transforming the law by offering a ground for critiquing hidden norms and 
assumptions of the law as well as by encouraging a vision of justice that is 
participatory and dialogic. The hermeneutic widens the circle of relevant 
considerations and offers a norm of inclusion in which all voices are necessary 
for a full conversation, including those traditionally silenced. See, e.g., Koons, 
Making Peace, supra note 13 (employing Potter’s Boxes to imagine justice in 
terms of inclusive mutuality). 
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considerations and given others undue weight,’ or ‘You’ve 
taken only a short-term view, or failed to comprehend what 
the purpose of our whole enterprise is.’103 
Each language not only contributes its distinctive orientation 
for organizing and understanding the world, but also serves as a 
necessary corrective to the partiality of the others. The 
interweaving of languages is essential to the framework of 
inclusive conversation and offers a structural assurance of regard 
“not only for the form of moral logic employed, but also for one’s 
capacity to get the facts straight, to judge whose welfare is at stake, 
and to interpret life in some fairly coherent manner.”104 
Western jurisprudence, based on Utilitarianism and 
Deontology, so often focuses on the facts and the law, neglecting 
considerations of relationships and meaning.105 For many legal 
scholars, the legitimacy of the legal system is squarely based on 
the necessity of judging by neutral principles.106 Despite such 
stated formalism, the law silently absorbs social norms into its 
“neutral principles.”107 Of moment to this article is the notion that 
                                                          
103 Potter 1979, supra note 93, at 147. To extend Potter’s schema, the four 
identified moral languages may be heard to ask: What is Good? What is Fitting? 
What is Right? What is True? 
104 Id. Addressing the problem of living and moral agency, Alasdair 
MacIntyre called for the development of thoughtful moral agency—one that is 
able to identify presuppositions and one that is able to reflectively choose how 
to live and how to work. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Recovery of Moral Agency?, 
HARV. DIV. BULL. 6 (Fall 1999) (The Dudleian Lecture at Harvard Divinity 
School, Apr. 16, 1999) (proposing that the knowledge needed for thoughtful 
moral agency is not theoretical, but practical). 
105 Inattention to stories of clients and considerations of wider meaning 
may be seen as leading to the impoverishment of the law. See, e.g., Christopher 
Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of 
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 86, 909, 920 (1992) 
(proposing that client narratives and the deeper meanings in clients’ struggles 
“hold the potential to make judges aware of and acknowledge the perspective of 
those excluded, and can empower lawyers with the ability to breathe life into 
stale, abstracted legal rules and doctrines.”). 
106 E.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A 
Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997). 
107 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1294, 1298 (inviting recognition 
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among the social norms that fill the law with meaning are 
pernicious ideas of gender hierarchy.108 Criminal law purports to 
be based on neutral principles, but remains full of contested 
meanings.109 
In the next section, the article constructs a hermeneutic of 
inclusive conversation to engage  in a gender analysis of domestic 
violence and the doctrinal strictures of the criminal justice system. 
By centering its analysis in four different domains, the article will 
illuminate some of the contradictions that structure the legal claims 
of women who live with—and kill—battering men. 
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE LIVED REALITY OF 
BATTERING: ASSESSING THE FACTS, LOYALTIES, NORMS, AND 
MEANINGS 
A. The Facts: Intimate Battering of Women 
Every fifteen seconds a woman is beaten in the United 
States.110 An estimated 1 million to 4.8 million women are 
                                                          
“of the ways in which the law absorbs and constitutes popular norms that it does 
not disclose and may even disavow” as well as the ways that criminal law “not 
only oppresses openly and in positive law, but quietly and constitutively.”). 
108 Victoria F. Nourse, Law’s Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 38-39 (2002) [hereinafter Nourse, Relational] (discussing the 
discrimination that is reflected in the rule of imminence, and the social norms 
that it absorbs, as “a discrimination of relation, a rule that reenacts a relation of 
inferiority and invisibility.”); Judith Lorber, “Night to His Day”: The Social 
Construction of Gender, in FEMINIST FRONTIERS 40 (Laurel Richardson et al. 
eds, 5th ed. 2001) (describing the social institution of gender in three ways: as a 
process of creating social statuses; as a part of a stratification system that 
hierarchically ranks men and women; and as a structure that “divides work in 
the home and in economic production, legitimates those in authority, and 
organizes sexuality and emotional life”). 
109 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1239. 
110 Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine 
of Self-Defense to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169 
(1991) [hereinafter Steele & Sigman] (referring to DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
July 16, 1990, at C3). 
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assaulted by their intimate partners every year.111 More precise 
figures are difficult to adduce because intimate assaults of women 
are only reported in one-fourth to one-seventh of all cases.112 
However, a number of sources estimate that one-third to one-half 
of all American women endure at least one physical assault by a 
partner during adulthood,113 and that up to twenty-five percent of 
all intimate relationships are marked by violence toward a female 
partner.114 
                                                          
111 Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 18, at 366 (1992); see also 
Incidents of Family Violence: A Special Study 341, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ibrs.htm (reporting data from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program that 3.2 million domestic 
violence incidents were reported in 2001); HARBOR HOUSE, NATIONAL 
STATISTICS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS DAMAGING PHYSICALLY AND 
EMOTIONALLY, available at 
http://www.harborhouseoccadv.com/facts/dvstats.htm (last visited June 29, 
2005) [hereinafter Harbor House] (citing National Violence Against Women 
Survey, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence (2002) 
for a reported annual estimate of 4.5 million physical assaults and 300,000 
sexual assaults against U.S. women). 
112 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE 
COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TO SOCIETY, at 
http://www.dccadv.org/statistics.htm (last visited June 28, 2005) [hereinafter 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA]; FLORIDA MORTALITY REVIEW PROJECT 3 (1997) 
(referring to Governor’s Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence for data 
that approximately one-seventh of domestic assaults come to the attention of 
police); see also HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (citing National Violence 
Against Women Survey (July 2000) for data that one-fourth of physical assaults 
against women by intimate partners were reported to police). 
113 Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18 
(referring to a 1992 report of the American Medical Association that as many as 
one in three women will be assaulted by an intimate partner during their 
lifetimes); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 10 nn.40-41 (citing LENORE WALKER, 
THE BATTERED WOMEN 19 (1979)) (estimating that half of all women will be 
battered at some point in their lives and noting estimates by other researchers 
that fifty to seventy percent of women are battered during marriage). 
114 Meier, supra note 17, at 1304 n.24 (advising that surveys show between 
one-fourth and one-fifth of marital or cohabiting relationships experience at least 
one incident of violence); Ann Coker et al., Frequency and Correlates of 
Intimate Partner Violence by Type: Physical, Sexual, and Psychological 
Battering, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 553 (Apr. 2000) (reporting results of a survey 
of 1401 women that 20.2 percent were currently experiencing intimate partner 
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“Domestic violence”115 is the major cause of injury to women, 
ranking above auto accidents, rapes, and muggings.116 Of the 
women who seek treatment in emergency rooms, an estimated 
twenty-two to thirty-five percent are treated from injuries related to 
ongoing partner abuse.117 
Between 2,000 and 4,000 women die each year at the hands of 
abusers, many of whom are husbands and boyfriends.118 Thirty 
                                                          
violence and 55.1 percent had experienced intimate partner violence in a current 
or past relationship with a male partner). 
115 For an overview of critiques of the use of the phrases “domestic 
violence,” “spouse abuse,” and “battered women,” see Meier, supra note 17. In 
studying intimate partner violence, some sociologists have identified four sub-
types: 1) situational couple violence, occurring in a non-controlling relationship; 
2) intimate terrorism (also called patriarchal terrorism), motivated by desire by a 
partner (usually a man) for general relationship control; 3) violent resistance, 
fighting back or acting in self-defense against a violent, controlling partner; and 
4) mutual violent control, characterized by violence and control by both 
partners. Wood, supra note ±, at 557 (noting that intimate terrorism is “the most 
extreme and dangerous kind of intimate violence”). 
116 E.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999) (citing 
Governor’s Task Force on Domestic Violence, The First Report 2 (1994)); 
HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (referring to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1991)). 
117 HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (citing David Adams, Identifying 
the Assaultive Husband in Court: You’re the Judge, BOSTON B. J. 33-34 (July-
Aug. 1989). 
118 Steele & Sigman, supra note 110, at 169 (referring to report of DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, July 16, 1990, at C3 that more than 2,000 women are 
murdered by husbands and boyfriends each year); Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1053 
(quoting Governor’s Task Force on Domestic Violence, The First Report 3 
(1994) that “[o]ver four thousand women die annually at the hands of their 
abuser.”). 
Men who engage in battering have their own stories to tell—stories of loss and, 
perhaps at a deeper level, stories from childhood of having witnessed their 
mothers being abused. Michelle Fine, Crime Stories: A Critical Look Through 
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 11 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN ED. 435 
(1998) (discussing, in a qualitative study of the life histories of residents of low-
income urban communities, the Astories of loss . . . voiced in a discourse of 
property rights of white, working class males); Levine, supra note 18, at 63 
(reporting that seventy-three percent of men in a study reported having been 
physically or sexually abused as children). In a study of men in a batterers’ 
intervention program that asked how men account for their battering and how 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
652 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
percent of female murder victims in 1990 were killed by their 
husbands or boyfriends, prompting one scholar to describe the 
phenomenon as “Intimate Femicide.”119 In Florida, spouses and 
cohabitants far outstrip other persons in committing the most 
domestic violence offenses.120 In 2004, for example, of 119,772 
reported domestic violence offenses in the state, 30,427 were 
committed by spouses and 36,289 were committed by 
cohabitants.121 
Medical expenses of women who are battered by intimate 
partners total $3 to $5 billion dollars each year.122 Businesses lose 
$100 million in lost wages, sick leave, absenteeism, and non-
productivity.123 An estimated twenty-five percent of workplace 
non-productivity arises out of domestic violence.124 Individual 
costs of spouse abuse include personal injuries from battery and 
                                                          
their accounts draw on their understandings of manhood, a sociologist identified 
“dueling narratives of manhood” in the accounts: a code of male superiority, in 
which perceived entitlements justified the exercise of violence and a code of 
chivalry, in which an attitude of protectionism was linked to women in the 
abstract or to specific women, such as mothers and daughters. Wood, supra note 
±, at 571, 573 (also noting that the mission of the program was to help men to 
“redefine what it means to be a man.”). 
119 The Paladin Group Grant Mentors, Domestic Violence Articles, 2, 
available at http://www.silcom.com/~paladin/madv/stats2.html (last visited June 
29, 2005) [hereinafter Paladin] (referring to study by Karen Stout, Intimate 
Femicide: A National Demographic Overview, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 3 (Feb. 
1991)). 
120 FLORIDA DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, STATEWIDE TRACKING OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES, at 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FSAC/Publications/dv-jan98.asp (recommending that 
a Domestic Violence Data Resource Center be established within the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement). 
121 For the 119,772 domestic violence crimes reported in 2004, the 
relationship of victim to offender was as follows: 30,427 (spouse), 11,670 
(parent), 9,361 (sibling), 9,213 (child), 7,978 (other family), 36,289 (cohabitant), 
14,834 (other). Id. (citing Florida Statistical Analysis Center, Crime in Florida, 
Florida Uniform Crime Report (1992-2004)). Of the 119,772 crimes reported, 
arrests were made in 64,072 cases. Id. 
122 Paladin, supra note 119 (citing COLORADO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
COALITION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (3d ed. 1991)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. (citing data from Minnesota Employee Assistance Providers). 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
 INTIMATE BATTERY AND THE LAW 653 
psychological injury from intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.125 Some women who have sought shelter have reported 
that the abusers have destroyed an estimated $10,000 of family 
property prior to separation.126 Moving expenses for a woman who 
is battered—when those funds are available—may cost another 
$5,000.127 
The drastic impact on women of a retreat rule for cohabitants is 
apparent when considering the pervasiveness of battering of 
women by husbands in the home. For example, every nine 
seconds, a husband physically abuses his wife in the United 
States.128 Women are abused in an estimated twelve percent of all 
marriages.129 
Physical violence is simply one aspect of the injury suffered by 
women who are battered. Domestic violence, as experienced by 
many women,130 is a continuing pattern of behavior that includes 
                                                          
125 Ann Campbell White, What You Didn’t Learn in Law School: Family 
Law and Domestic Violence, 68 FLA. B. J. 38, 40 (Oct. 1994). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1054 (Fla. 1999) (citing Executive 
Office of the Governor, The Governor’s Task Force on Domestic and Sexual 
Violence, The Third Report, vii (March 31, 1997)). 
129 Id. (citing Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: 
Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 
702 (1994)). 
130 In evaluating commonalities in perceived patterns of battering, I am not 
arguing that the experiences of women who live with battering men are the 
same. E.g., Koons, Making Peace, supra note 13, at 64-65 (discussing 
difference, sameness, commonality, and connection in proposing a model of 
inclusive mutuality as a praxis for justice). Experiences of battering carry with 
them enormous complexity and variety. E.g., Christina Nicolaidis et al., Could 
We Have Known? A Qualitative Analysis of Data From Women Who Have 
Survived an Attempted Homicide by an Intimate Partner, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 788, 792 (Oct. 2003). In seeking to avoid the perils of essentialism, I 
also situate the article within the theoretical frame of “the personal is political.” 
Pepi Leistyna et al., Glossary, in BREAKING FREE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
POWER OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 336-37 (Pepi Leistyna et al. eds., 1996) 
(defining essentialism as an orientation that “ascribes a fundamental nature or 
biological determinism to humans . . . .Within this monolithic and homogenizing 
view, categories such as race and gender become gross generalizations, and 
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physical and non-physical manifestations of power and control.131 
Yet, the law often focuses on discrete incidents of physical 
violence—the “number of hits”—not the “continuum of sexual and 
verbal abuse, threats, economic coercion, stalking, and social 
isolation” that is the experiential nature of domestic violence.132 
Some women who have been battered by their male partners 
describe the non-physical abuse, including humiliation and 
psychological degradation, as particularly painful.133 A man who 
                                                          
single-cause explanations about individual character.”); see also Fine, supra 
note 118, at 5 (“While we refuse essentialisms of race and gender, and must 
recognize enormous individual variation within groups, we also need to 
emphasize that the intersectionalities of race, gender, and class lead to important 
questions and generalizations” about violence in communities). “The personal is 
political,” as received wisdom of the women’s movement, continues to have 
vitality in challenging the deadly belief that experiences, such as battering, are 
too unique or personal to be discussed in public and, being sequestered in the 
private realm, are not deserving of political attention or resolution. IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 120-21 (1990) (explaining 
that the slogan “expresses the principle that no social practices or activities 
should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or 
collective choice.”). 
131 Battering is “the establishment of control and fear in a relationship 
through violence and other forms of abuse. The batterer uses acts of violence 
and a series of behaviors, including intimidation, threats, psychological abuse, 
[and] isolation . . . to coerce and control the other person.” OREGON 
COMMISSION AGAINST DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
MYTHS AND FACTS, at http://www.ocadsv.com/myths.htm (citing Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1990); see also Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 961 (2004) 
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer] (characterizing domestic violence as “an ongoing 
pattern of behavior defined by both physical and non-physical manifestations of 
power.”). 
132 SCHNEIDER, LAWMAKING, supra note 17, at 65; Tuerkheimer, supra 
note 131, at 963-65 (asserting that power and control are at the heart of 
battering, “[y]et the boundaries of criminal law have remained largely 
impermeable” to an accurate and accepted understanding of battering). 
133 Charles Patrick Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense, 14 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 579, 587 (1990) (arguing for the permissible use of deadly force to 
prevent serious psychological injury). In State v. Norman, the intermediate 
appellate court recounted the following facts as part of the non-physical trauma 
that Ms. Norman experienced the day before killing her husband while he slept: 
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batters often exercises domination by making rules that his partner 
must follow, such as dictating with whom she may talk, monitoring 
phone conversations, identifying what clothes she may wear, 
denoting how household chores must be done, keeping her from 
reading materials or ideas that he does not like,  requiring her to 
ask permission to leave the room or take a bath, forcing her to stay 
awake, and requiring her to engage in demeaning activities like 
kneeling or begging for money.134 A man who batters may also 
establish forms of abuse as enforcement mechanisms for violations 
of rules.135 Rule-making and punishing eventually give way to “a 
                                                          
“[John] Norman asked [Judy Norman] to make him a sandwich; when [Judy] 
brought it to him, he threw it on the floor and told her to make him another. 
[Judy] made him a second sandwich and brought it to him; [John] again threw it 
on the floor, telling her to put something on her hands because he did not want 
her to touch the bread. [Judy] made a third sandwich using a paper towel to 
handle the bread. [John] took the third sandwich and smeared it in [Judy’s] 
face.” State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d 378 
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (also noting that, in the thirty-six hours prior to his death, 
he forced her to commit prostitution to make money, made threats to cut off her 
breast “and shove it up her rear end,” made a number of threats to kill family 
members, interfered with emergency medical personnel who were trying to 
revive her from an overdose of pills (saying, “Let the bitch die . . . . She ain’t 
nothing but a dog. She don’t deserve to live.”), and repeatedly physically 
assaulted her in a number of ways). 
134 Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (1992-1993) (citing 
the following examples of rules made by a battering husband: “that no one 
(including guests and their toddler children) wear shoes in the house, that the 
furniture be in the same indentations in the carpet, that the vacuum marks in the 
carpet be parallel, that any sand that spilled from the children’s sandbox during 
their play be removed from the surrounding grass.”). Any real or imagined 
infraction of these kind of rules often resulted in a beating or the expression of 
irritation that was a prelude to a beating. Id. Four rules are cited as most 
important to men who batter: “1. You cannot leave this relationship unless I am 
through with you. 2. You may not tell anyone about my violence or coercive 
controls. 3. I am entitled to your obedience, service, affection, loyalty, fidelity, 
and undivided attention. 4. I get to decide which of the other rules are critical.” 
Barbara J. Hart, Rule Making and Enforcement / Rule Compliance and 
Resistance, in I AM NOT YOUR VICTIM 259 (Bethel Sipe & Evelyn J. Hall eds., 
1996). 
135 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2131. 
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general climate of increasingly subtle control, where the batterer 
needs to do less and less to structure his family’s behavior.”136 
In many cases, keys to the enforcement mechanisms for rule 
violations are fear, emotional abuse, and social isolation.137 To 
control a partner by fear, a man who batters may use a symbol, a 
look, or a gesture associated with abuse to signal the threat of 
violence.138 Men who batter may also use “mental games” to 
control women.139 One man explained that after he had hit his 
girlfriend once, “I never hit her again ever. I was more mental.”140 
Mental and emotional abuse can be just as devastating as physical 
abuse. According to one survivor: 
He always found something wrong with what I did, even if 
I did what he asked. No matter what it was. It was never the 
way he wanted it. I was either too fat, didn’t cook the food 
right . . . .I think he wanted to hurt me. To hurt me in the 
sense . . . to make me feel like I was a nothing.141 
Battering, as experienced by many women, is distorted when 
read through doctrines such as imminence.142 In the context of the 
                                                          
136 Id. at 2129. 
137 Id. at 2131-32. 
138 Id. at 2120, 2126. 
139 Wood, supra note ±, at 561-62 (articulating seven themes in a study of 
twenty-two incarcerated men who had volunteered for a batterers’ intervention 
program, including justifications (“A man has a right to control his woman.”), 
dissociations (“My violence was limited.”), and remorse (“I regret that I abused 
her.”)). 
140 Id. at 566 (noting that men who engaged in battering defined their 
violence as limited by pointing out the limits that they observed, such as not 
hitting a partner when she was pregnant). 
141 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2117 (quoting the text of an interview of one 
of eighty-three women seeking court protection from battering partners in Karla 
Fisher, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of Protection for 
Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois 
(Urbana-Champaign)). 
142 In the law of self-defense, a force is imminent “if it will occur 
‘immediately’ or ‘at once.’ The danger must be ‘pressing and urgent.’ Force is 
not imminent if an aggressor threatens to harm another person at a later time.” 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 229; see also Mahoney, supra 
note 17, at 84 (arguing that decisions that construe imminence “as virtually 
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killing of a battering man by a woman, imminence is a confused 
doctrine.143 While it purports to be based simply on the passage of 
time, imminence actually reflects subjective social norms, such as 
that a woman who lives with a battering man “should have left”  
the room, the house, or the relationship.144 Infused with 
suppositions about gender roles and behavior, imminence often 
functions as a retreat rule to enforce unspoken societal assumptions 
that women should leave battering relationships before episodes of 
violence take place.145 Yet, requiring retreat, in whatever form, 
exposes women to greater danger of abuse.146 
The unworkability of a retreat rule is manifest when 
considering the phenomenon of separation assault. Legal scholars 
have defined separation assault as “the attack on the woman’s body 
and volition in which her partner keeps her from leaving, retaliates 
for the separation, or forces her to return.”147 The concept of 
separation assault recognizes that patterns of violence, already 
dramatic, often increase upon a woman’s separation from a 
                                                          
equivalent to immediacy place significant limits on the ability of women to raise 
claims that they acted in self-defense.”). 
143 “If imminence serves as a proxy for other self-defense factors—
questions of motive and emotion and retreat—then scholars of self-defense 
should be worried not only that imminence is sloppy but also that, as applied, 
imminence invites doctrinal confusion.” Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 
1260. 
144 Id. at 1281-83; see also Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 36-38 
(illustrating how time absorbs social norms (i.e., she should have left)). 
145 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1281-85 (also noting the 
incongruity of requiring a woman to leave before a confrontation occurs). 
146 Melissa Wheatcroft, Note, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants—In New 
Jersey A Battered Spouse’s Home is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 566 
(1999) (arguing that “[a] safe retreat for the battered spouse is often an 
impossibility.”); see also U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(outlining general principles of self-defense and observing: “The doctrine of 
retreat was never intended to enhance the risk to the innocent; its proper 
application has never required a faultless victim to increase his assailant’s safety 
at the expense of his own.”). For discussion of states observing the cohabitant 
exception to the castle doctrine, see supra note 53. 
147 Separation assault (an attack on the separation) “is an attempt to gain, 
retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the 
relationship. It often takes place over time.” Mahoney, supra note 17, at 65-66. 
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battering man.148 According to the Department of Justice, seventy-
five percent of assaults occur when the abused party is divorced or 
separated from the abuser.149 Another study indicates that forty-
five percent of murders of women arise out of a man’s “rage over 
the actual or impending estrangement from his partner.”150 Women 
who are separated from their spouses are three times more likely to 
be attacked than divorced women and twenty-five times more 
likely to be attacked than married women.151 
Even a limited retreat rule, as had been carved out by the 
Florida Supreme Court, places women at increased risk of 
violence. It is at the moment of separation—the first physical move 
toward separation—that a battering man is prone to become more 
violent.152 A decision —or even a threat—to leave can trigger 
lethal violence.153 Because domestic violence is marked by power 
and control, attempting to exit a room may be considered 
“disobedience,” spurring escalated violence.154 Resistance 
                                                          
148 Id. at 5-6. 
149 Linda Dakis, Injunctions for Protection, 68 FLA. BAR J. 48, 50 (Oct. 
1994) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 
(1983)); see also Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 1, 4 (reporting that 
women separated from husbands were victimized at a rate three times higher 
than women who were divorced and twenty-five times higher than women who 
were married). 
150 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999) (quoting a study in 
DONALD G. DUTTON, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 15 (1995)). 
151 Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 2. 
152 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5-6. A study of thirty women who survived 
attempted femicide found that, in the majority of cases, the attack took place as 
the woman was trying to leave the relationship. Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 
731. See also Deborah J. Anderson, The Impact of Subsequent Violence on 
Returning to an Abusive Partner, 34 J. COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUD. 93 (2003) 
(demonstrating that victims of domestic violence who temporarily leave an 
abusive relationship experience an average of eight more violent incidents per 
year than victims who stay). 
153 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5-6 (discussing separation assault where a 
decision to leave triggers an attack). 
154 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 963 (noting the ubiquity of a “power 
and control” dynamic in the lives of women who live with battering men). See 
also Hart, supra note 134, at 259 (advising that many men who commit intimate 
battery create a hierarchy of rule and enforcement measures for disobedience of 
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strategies (such as leaving a room) may force an abuser “to make 
his coercive power explicit. Any threat, however small, to the 
abuser’s authority within the family is likely to be met with 
violence.”155 According to one woman, “The best way to avoid 
[battering] was to show as little reaction as possible . . . . I didn’t 
dare argue with him or challenge him—for fear of my life 
actually.”156 Trying to exit past a raging man may be the final 
move of a woman seeking only to avoid violence.157 Killing a 
battering man may be the safest available alternative.158 
B. The Loyalties: The Relational Context of Battering of 
Women 
The second movement of the hermeneutic invites consideration 
of relationships.  Yet, the language of law—individuality, 
neutrality, and abstraction—blocks us from talking about values, 
relationships, and structural injustice.159 Because legal language is 
unable to express the “complex relationship between power, 
gender, and knowledge” and because the framework of battering 
inexorably links power, control, and violence, the law does not 
apprehend the experience of many women who live with battering 
men.160 
                                                          
the rules). 
155 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2133. 
156 Id. at 2130 n.69 (quoting a participant in a study by LIZ KELLY, 
SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 180 (1988)). 
157 Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791, 793 (finding, in a study of survivors 
of attempted femicide, that nearly half of the victims were surprised by the 
attacks and were trying the leave relationships for reasons other than violence); 
see also Levine, supra note 18, at 63 (noting that seventy-three percent of men 
in a study reported having been physically or sexually abused as children). 
158 Evan Stark, Rethinking Homicide: Violence, Race, and the Politics of 
Gender, 20 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 18 (1990) (proposing that killing may be 
the safest alternative due to the absence or ineffectiveness of police protection). 
159 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of 
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 896 
(1989) (also identifying the language of neutrality as a device for silencing 
women). 
160 Id.; Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5 (pointing to power and control as “the 
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Objectivity, conflict, legal status, and atomized events form the 
terrain of the law.161 However, relationship forms the terrain of the 
system of domination of many men who engage in battering.162 
The relational context of a battering relationship has been 
characterized by three elements: a systematic pattern of domination 
and control; abuse (physical, emotional, sexual, familial, or 
property); and denying, hiding, or minimizing the abuse.163 
Relationally, the dynamics of battering are much like that of 
hostage-taking.164 One survivor of battering put it like this: 
I just couldn’t take all this . . . Panicked and caged, and not 
being able to go anywhere and do anything. It was like he 
was an animal trainer, coming in and beating on the bars of 
the cage with a stick—only he was outside the bars so he 
couldn’t get hurt.165 
Unlike the admiration expressed for male hostages who resist 
captors in wartime, a woman who resists her captor is not 
acclaimed, socially or legally, when that captor is a battering male 
partner.166 
                                                          
heart of the battering process.”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 966, 978 
(arguing that the law fails to hear and provide justice for women in battering 
relationships). 
161 Finley, supra note 159, at 899 (recognizing law as a language of 
conflict); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 962-63 (arguing that “[p]aradigmatic 
crimes are ‘‘transaction-bound.’”). 
162 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 973; Fischer, supra note 134, at 2119, 
2141, 2172. 
163 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2141. 
164 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 87-88 (noting cases that make “a persuasive 
analogy” between women who are battered and prisoners of war). A finding of 
imminence should not be precluded where a hostage grabs a gun and kills a 
guard who has fallen asleep. Id. at 87 (citing State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 584 
(Kan. 1988) (Herd, J., dissenting)). 
165 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2132 (quoting survivor of battering in JEAN 
GILES-SIMS, WIFE BATTERING: A SYSTEMS THEORY 114 (1983)). 
166 “The common law’s overt judgment that a woman who kills her 
husband is fully traitorous, and a man who kills to defend his marriage is partly 
patriot, remains two hundred years later.” Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 
1293-94; see also HERMAN, supra note 18, at 74 (commenting that “[p]olitical 
captivity is generally recognized, whereas domestic captivity is often unseen.”). 
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The law may be seen as structurally disabled from hearing and 
responding to the relational dynamics that are often at the heart of 
battering of women by intimate partners.167 For example, the law is 
structured around the statutory definition of criminal homicide and 
applicable defenses.168 All of the parties are required to focus on 
whether the facts meet the elements of the offense, which is 
structured in terms of discrete events.169 The law may preclude 
witnesses from disclosing in court a contextualized story of 
battering, and instead authorize women who have killed their 
battering partners to tell only “mangled,” decontextualized stories 
of discrete incidents of physical violence.170 Consequently, there is 
often a fundamental structural disconnect between incident-based 
legal doctrine and a woman’s experiences of living with a battering 
partner.171 
Relation may be seen as the framework not only for patterns of 
                                                          
167 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1030 (arguing against abandoning 
criminal law, despite its failure to recognize and remedy harms to women); 
Finley, supra note 159, at 906-07 (asserting that, despite the dilemma of legal 
language, we cannot disengage from the law or legal discourse). Cf. GORDON 
KAUFMAN, IN FACE OF MYSTERY: A CONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY 51-52 (1993) 
(proposing that, as a worldview cracks, “we need a new faith, that is, a new 
frame of orientation, if we are to go on. Such a new frame is never simply spun 
out of thin air. It is always the product of rebuilding, transforming, reshaping the 
old categories . . . This is a precarious and dangerous project, repairing and 
rebuilding the very boat which keeps us afloat.”). 
168 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 221, 540 (outlining 
elements of homicide and self-defense); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 977 
(framing the content of a prosecutor’s interview of a victim of battering by the 
statutory definition of assault). 
169 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 976-80 (critiquing the incident-based 
structure of the criminal law that inattends the continuum of battering). 
170 Id. at 989-98 (noting the antipathy with which law views prior-act 
character evidence). But see Maguigan, supra note 18, at 383 (concluding from 
a survey of appellate opinions that legal doctrine does not exclude consideration 
of social context); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 532 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CRIMINAL] (noting the 
clear judicial trend to admit battered woman syndrome evidence in cases of 
confrontational homicide, which explicitly requires evidence of a history of 
abuse). 
171 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 992. 
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battering but also for a variety of choices made by many women 
who live with battering men. As rational actors, women who are 
battered often employ a host of strategies to attempt to stop the 
abuse.172 In one study, women tried an average of thirteen different 
strategies each, including talking to the abuser, consulting with 
friends and family, calling the police, leaving the abuser, and 
trying to obtain counseling and legal assistance.173 
Strategies engaged by women who live with battering men are 
often embedded in complex interpersonal and communal 
relationships.174 A woman’s relationship with an abusive partner 
may be marked by love and commitment. Explained one woman: 
[M]y husband is an alcoholic. Things have been really bad 
these past few years. But we’ve been married thirteen 
years. And I have three children. For nine of those years, he 
was the best husband and father anyone could have asked 
for. The way I look at it, he has a disease. I know that when 
he’s not drinking, he’s not like this. I may have to leave. 
But if I do, I’m not giving up on a father for the children, 
and I’m not giving up on him. And I can’t just throw away 
those nine years.175 
Women with children may make decisions on the basis of 
                                                          
172 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2135-36 (discussing a study of women who 
obtained protective orders and thirty-one strategies they had employed to stop 
the violence). 
173 Id; see also People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (1996) (recounting the 
strategies employed to stop the abuse, such as “hiding, running away, 
counterviolence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a shelter, and 
contacting police.”). 
174 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 20. 
175 Id. at 21; Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse 
Victims Stay, 28-OCT COLO. LAW. 19, 21, 23 (1999) (listing fifty obstacles to 
leaving an abuser and noting, under “Excuses,” that “[d]omestic violence is not 
caused by stress or substance abuse, although it can exacerbate the problem” 
and, under “Love,” that a “victim may say [she] still loves the perpetrator, 
although she definitely wants to violence to stop.”); see also Nan Seuffert, 
Critique and Comment: Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and 
Complex Personhood in the Law, 23 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 211, 212 (1999) 
(suggesting that some feminists may be uncomfortable with the assertion by 
some women that they love men who abuse them). 
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“extended, collective, multiple self-interest.”176 Mothers may 
conclude that their children are best served by remaining in 
relationships with the children’s fathers.177 It may be “safer to 
stay” with a man who is abusive, keeping a eye on him so that a 
woman may protect herself and her children.178 
Economic considerations may drive the choices of women who 
live with battering men. Financial despair is the number one reason 
that women return to men who batter.179 Among the forms of abuse 
engaged by some men is financial abuse, in which women are 
deprived of money, access to accounts and financial records, and 
participation in financial decision-making.180 When a woman 
leaves a man who batters, she may quickly be confronted with the 
impossibility of providing for herself and her children.181 If a 
woman is eligible for welfare, the amount received will be 
woefully inadequate to support herself and her children.182 Where a 
                                                          
176 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 19. 
177 Buel, supra note 175, at 20 (advising that some mothers believe that 
having two parents in a home is in a child’s best interests, particularly where the 
abuser does not assault the child, but that the women and other parties in the 
criminal justice system may not be aware of the harm to children of witnessing 
domestic violence). Male children who witness domestic violence “are many 
times more likely to batter their spouses.” Levine, supra note 18, at 63 (referring 
to ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE’LL BE DEAD 84 (1994)). Furthermore, “[a] child 
who witnessed domestic violence is more likely to grow into a perpetrator or 
victim of domestic violence than a child who was himself or herself abused.” Id. 
(citing G.T. Hotaling & D.B. Sugarman, An Analysis of Risk Markers in 
Husband to Wife Violence: The Current State of Knowledge, 1 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 101 (1986)). 
178 Buel, supra note 175, at 25 (noting that, where an abuser has previously 
stalked and threatened her, a woman is very aware that the abuser is capable of 
finding her and the children if she tries to move away). 
179 Id. at 21 (referring to a Texas study that found that eighty-five percent 
of women who called hotlines, emergency rooms, and shelters had left abusers 
“a minimum of five times previously, with the number one reason cited for 
returning to the batterer being financial despair.”). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 The primary safety net for women who are fleeing battering men is 
welfare (now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). Id. Assuming 
eligibility, most states pay less than $400 a month for a household of three. Id. 
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woman is employed, an abusive man may harass or terrorize her at 
work, long after she has separated from him. Moreover, a woman’s 
wages may not provide her enough to make ends meet.183 One 
survivor who later became a lawyer and a law professor explained: 
I’m a single Mom, without child support and trying to go to 
night school and keep my job. But with minimum wage, I 
can’t seem to pay both day care and the rent, so sometimes 
I think about going back, just to make sure my son has 
enough to eat. It hurts more to watch him eat macaroni with 
ketchup for the third night, than it ever did to get beaten.184 
Consequently, a woman who contemplates the economics of 
leaving a battering relationship may balance harm to children 
through inadequate subsistence with the harm from maintaining the 
                                                          
While welfare is an important tool for combating domestic violence, its 
usefulness has been undermined by measures that tie women into continuing 
contact with abusive men. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension 
of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
121, 139-40, 166 (2002); see also Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow 
Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds a Warning about the 
Implications for Women of the Contemporary Marriage Movement, 17 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 339, 342-43 (2002) (drawing on the historical precedent of 
France, circa 1792 to 1816, to suggest that the “contemporary Marriage 
Movement is intertwined with a political backlash against the rights of women,” 
and that what is being jeopardized in the pro-marriage campaign is “women’s 
safety and dignity, as well as their ability to protect themselves and their 
children from domestic violence.”); Koons, Motherhood, supra note 5 (engaging 
a 500-year retrospective on key concepts in welfare reform to critique the 
marriage incentives of welfare reauthorization). 
183 In a survey of 379 work-reliant and welfare-reliant single mothers in 
four cities in the United States, sociologists Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein found 
that none of the 165 wage laborers in the survey was able to meet her expenses 
with income earned from employment. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING 
ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE 
WORK 107 (1997). Earning an average of below $800 per month in employment 
income, low-income mothers in the labor force experienced a shortfall that 
ranged from $295 to $530 per month, depending on their housing. Id. The 214 
women who were reliant on welfare experienced a shortfall that averaged $189 
to $519 per month. Id. at 4. 
184 Buel, supra note 175, at 19 (quoting the author’s journal, 1977). 
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relationship.185 If children are not directly threatened, a woman 
may choose subsistence for them rather than safety for herself.186 
Race-based concerns may also guide decision-making because 
a woman may worry about how the police will treat a man of 
color.187 Some women of color have reported the experience of 
being forced to choose between gender and race in deciding 
whether to contact the criminal justice system.188 In those 
circumstances, some women of color have also reported “siding 
with race” because “the white-controlled criminal justice system 
has not attempted to address the race-based inequities reflected in 
the disproportionate number of men of color arrested, prosecuted, 
and incarcerated.”189 Furthermore, some critics have observed that 
                                                          
185 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 23. 
186 Buel, supra note 175, at 19-20 (suggesting that mothers may be unaware 
of the impact on children of witnessing domestic violence, even if the children 
were not directly assaulted). 
187 Id. at 20 (stating that a woman may be more concerned about police 
treatment of a man of color than about her own safety). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. The codification of the castle doctrine not only exposes gender 
inequities, but also racial injustice, particularly when considering the role of 
mistake in justifiable homicide. Many jurisdictions have adopted the principle of 
“imperfect self-defense” in which an honest but unreasonable actor stands 
convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. E.g., GARDNER & SINGER, supra 
note 22, at 1068. Expanding the concept of imperfect self-defense, the Model 
Penal Code makes the test of justification the actor’s belief in the necessity for 
using force. Model Penal Code ‘ 3.09 cmt. at 150 (1985). Consequently, where a 
defendant is mistaken as to the need to use force (as where the aggressor was 
reaching for his handkerchief), the doctrine of imperfect self-defense embodies a 
willingness of the criminal justice system to recognize the circumstances under 
which a defendant may have been required to make split-second decisions. 
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1068. Due to the phenomenon of 
unconscious racism, the statutory castle doctrine, when combined with the role 
of mistake in self-defense, operates to place people of color at greater risk of 
deadly assault. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (noting that much of the behavior 
that produces racial discrimination arises from cultural belief systems and is 
influenced by unconscious racial motivation). The Implicit Association Test has 
been developed by psychologists at Harvard and other institutions to measure 
implicit (or unconscious) attitudes about age, gender, race, presidents, sexuality, 
Arab-Muslims, weight, religion, disability, Native Americans, Asian-Americans, 
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many shelters and intervention programs do not reflect the racial 
and cultural diversity of people who are served.190 
When considering relational issues on a broader scale, some 
communities have failed not only to protect many women but also 
to provide needed resources. 191 A woman may not be able to leave 
a battering man because there is no place to go.192 Affordable 
housing is simply not available to meet the needs of poor women 
and children.193 Studies demonstrate that approximately fifty 
percent of homeless women with children are fleeing violent 
men.194 Women who leave battering relationships often 
immediately encounter a paucity of resources. Shelters are 
generally unable to fill the huge demand for services.195 Moreover, 
                                                          
weapons, and skin-tone. See Project Implicit, at 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May 4, 2005); see also Anthony 
G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: 
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 
1464, 1464-65 (1998) (defining implicit attitudes as “actions or judgments that 
are under the control of automatically activated evaluation, without the 
performer’s awareness of that causation” and proposing that the implicit 
association method may reveal attitudes (including racial attitudes) of which the 
subjects may be unaware); see also Robert D. McFadden, U.S. Examining 
Killing of Man in Police Volley, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1 (reporting the 
controversy surrounding the death of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African 
street peddler, who was shot in a barrage of forty-one bullets by four white 
police officers who thought he had a gun, when he was reaching for his wallet). 
190 Buel, supra note 175, at 20 (recognizing greater use and success of 
services that are race- and culture-specific). 
191 Meier, supra note 17, at 1309. 
192 Buel, supra note 175, at 24 (asserting “the bleak reality that affordable 
housing is at a premium in virtually every community in this country, including 
our Tribal Nations.”). 
193 Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is His Castle: How the Law Shelters 
Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 99 
(2004) (noting the paradox of the denial of a fundamental right to housing and 
the cultural significance of “home” as a “man’s castle,” but only for those who 
can afford it). 
194 Meier, supra note 17, at 1311 n.52. 
195 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 62; see also Katherine M. Culliton, Legal 
Remedies for Domestic Violence in Chile and the United States: Cultural 
Relativism, Myths, and Realities, 94 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT’L L. 183 
(1994) (debunking myth that violence against women is more prevalent in Latin 
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shelters may make referrals to social service agencies that do not 
have resources to meet basic needs for income, food, clothing, 
child care, health care, job training, and transportation.196 One 
study concluded that women may leave abusive relationships and 
seek help from formal and informal sources, only to discover “that 
it was the helping professions, rather than battered women, that 
were afflicted with ‘helplessness.’”197 
Women who kill battering men also enter into a significant 
relationship with the state.198 The state provides the structure, 
process, substantive rules, counsel, timing, cultural meaning, range 
of permissible outcomes, and institutional punishment for women 
claiming self-defense. Critics of the state’s role in the tragic 
dynamic have cited the tendency of the criminal justice system to 
blame women for abuse and to deny or trivialize the violence.199 
                                                          
America than in the United States by noting one million women are turned away 
each year in the United States because shelters are full). There are 1,500 battered 
women’s shelters in the United States and 3,800 animal shelters. Paladin, supra 
note 122, at 1-2 (also reciting that the first women’s shelter, Women’s 
Advocates, opened in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1974). 
196 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 62. 
197 Id. at 61. “Mary,” a survivor of battering, related the story of losing 
custody of her four-year old son to Russ, her abusive husband: “Attorney # 3 
sent me to a psychologist whose attitude reminded me of Lawyer #1. This 
psychologist, a woman, said ‘‘we’ll get him,’ referring to Russ’s psychologist. 
That is, the . . . key was for her to ‘win’; she did not focus on the safety or well-
being of my children and me. . . . . She was so self-absorbed. I can still picture 
her tossing her hair flirtaciously as she made remarks that destroyed me and my 
children.” Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From 
One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 53, 55-56 (1998) (also characterizing 
the lawyers and psychologists as “very self-promoting and egotistical. It seemed 
as if everyone was having a good time, playing the game of litigation and 
psychology. All the while, my life was on the line. My children and I did not 
matter. I also felt like the lawyers and psychologists were running a cash register 
business at my expense. They were a lot more interested in my money than my 
welfare. The first two years of my divorce proceedings cost me more than 
twenty-five thousand dollars.”). 
198 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1275 (explaining that there are two 
different relationships that are implicated in every criminal law defense—”the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim and the relationship between 
the victim and the state.”). 
199 Appearing before a judge to obtain an order of protection, “Mary” 
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One judge acknowledged “tremendous gaps” in our justice system 
in which the “court system has persistently overlooked domestic 
violence in noncriminal and criminal cases.”200 Few women report 
incidents of violence because many think that “the police would 
not or could not do anything for them.”201 
When women do take the step of killing abusers, in many cases 
the deaths take place during assaults.202 To survivors of attempted 
intimate femicide, it may seem that the state’s response not only 
requires them to fit their stories into discordant legal doctrines such 
as de jure and de facto retreat rules, but also gives them longer 
prison sentences than men who kill their partners.203 
                                                          
recounted: “The judge said, in a dismissive way, ‘It’s been a year and a half 
since he last beat you. Is last week’s threat really serious?’” Waits, supra note 
197, at 45, 56 (also advising that the judge who heard the custody case had an 
outstanding protective order issued against him by his former wife). Referring to 
the “ideology that protects the institution of marriage and the state’s 
participation in subordinating women,” Mahoney noted obscurantism at two 
levels—the obscuring of the self-interest of a man to act violently at the 
individual level and the masking of male domination underlying violence 
against women at the state level. Mahoney, supra note 17, at 12-13 (citing James 
Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE 
ABUSE 155 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)); see also Maguigan, 
supra note 18, at 386-87 (arguing, due to a reversal rate of forty percent in 
homicide cases defended by women who were battered and an average reversal 
rate of 8.5 percent, that trial courts were not correctly applying long-standing 
principles of self-defense to prosecutions of women who kill abusive men). 
200 Judge Lynn Tepper, The Court’s Role in Ending Family Violence, 68 
FLA. BAR. J. 30, 31 (1994). 
201 HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (referring to the National Violence 
Against Women Survey (July 2000) for data that one-fourth of physical assaults 
against women by intimate partners were reported to police); see also Paladin, 
supra note 122, at 5 (reporting that police were more likely to respond within 
five minutes if the offender were a stranger than if an offender were known to 
the woman who was battered and citing a Department of Justice survey, Ronet 
Bachman, Violence Against Women: A National Crime Victimization Survey 
Report 9 (Jan. 1994)). 
202 Maguigan, supra note 18, at 384 (advising that “over seventy percent of 
all battered women who kill do so when faced with either an ongoing attack or 
the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury” and that the figure may be 
closer to ninety percent). 
203 The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the Pace 
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To understand the apparent disparity in these prison sentences 
as something other than a disturbing anomaly requires an 
understanding of the way that the law is constituted. From a 
constitutive perspective, the state reads relational social norms into 
the law.204 The norms instantiate a quiet and deadly gender 
hierarchy that is disclaimed by other stated legal norms.205 Yet, the 
gender hierarchy is pervasive.206 The prison sentences of women 
                                                          
University Battered Women’s Justice Center estimate that women who kill an 
intimate partner receive sentences of fifteen to twenty years while men who kill 
intimate partners receive sentences of two to six years. Developments, supra 
note 31, at 1574 n.3 (referring to Michael Dowd, Director, Pace University 
Battered Women’s Justice Center); Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of 
Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 284 n.3 
(1996) (also referring to estimates by the National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence). Two reports from the Department of Justice indicated that women 
faced shorter sentences for killing a spouse. Id. at 258-59 (citing Patrick A. 
Langan & John M. Dawson, Spouse Murder Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties (1995) and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence Between Intimates 
(1994)). Those studies, which do not appear on the list of Bureau of Justice 
Statistics publications from 2005 to 1994, have been criticized as failing to 
account for legally relevant variables, such as level of severity of crime, prior 
criminal records, and lack of provocation. Id.at 259; see VICTIM 
CHARACTERISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATIONS, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_v.htm#publications. 
204 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1283, 1287. 
205 Id. at 1238, 1268 (demonstrating how law absorbs social meaning “and 
thus constitutes gender inequity.”); cf. LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN 
ISLAM 245 (1992) (arguing that Western cultures are not less androcentric or 
misogynist than Middle Eastern societies, “but that women in Western societies 
were able to draw on the political vocabularies and systems generated by ideas 
of democracy and the rights of the individual, vocabularies and political systems 
developed by white male middle classes to safeguard their interests and not 
intended to be applicable to women.”). 
206 Lorber, supra note 108, at 40, 53 (describing how gendered people 
emerge from the social order, beginning with assignment to a sex category at 
birth, which becomes a gender status through naming, dress, and other gender 
markers). 
Once a child’s gender is evident, others treat those in one gender 
differently from those in the other, and the children respond to the 
different treatment by feeling different and behaving differently . . . . 
Adolescent boys and girls approach and avoid each other in an 
elaborately scripted and gendered mating dance. Parenting is gendered, 
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who kill abusive men, like the retreat rules, may be seen as 
manifestations of relations of domination and subordination. They 
reflect the ways in which the law and the legal system are 
constructed to meet the needs and interests of the prototypical 
human being—a male batterer—not a woman who lives with a 
battering man.207 
C. The Norms: Self-Defense for Women Who Kill Battering 
Men 
In the next turn of the hermeneutic, the normative principles 
that constitute the law of self-defense are interrogated. The claim 
of self-defense by a woman who has killed a battering man is  
structured by doctrines that often are hostile to her experiences. 
Four main issues in the jurisprudence of self-defense are as 
follows: 1) the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions; 2) the 
proportionality of the force employed; 3) the defendant’s duty to 
retreat, if required; and 4) the temporal proximity or imminence of 
the danger.208 As presently constituted, for women who kill 
abusive men, the defense is nearly impossible to prove.209 
                                                          
with different expectations for mothers and fathers, and people of 
different genders work at different kinds of jobs. 
Id. at 40. 
207 Meier, supra note 17, at 1302 (observing that men who batter frequently 
test within the normal range on psychiatric tests, while victims are typically seen 
as pathological); see also HERMAN, supra note 18, at 75 (noting that Adolph 
Eichmann, who had committed terrible crimes against humanity, had been 
certified as normal by a half a dozen psychiatrists); Koons, Making Peace, supra 
note 13, at 35-40 (decentering the normative center of the law that protects the 
interests of White, Euro-American, heterosexual men of privilege). 
208 Maguigan, supra note 18, at 385; see also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 28, at 221-23 (outlining the elements of self-defense as including 
necessity, proportionality, and a reasonable-belief rule “that is based on 
reasonable appearances, rather than on objective reality.”). 
209 Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The 
Toothless Tigress Can Now Roar, 74 FLA. BAR. J. 14, 16 (2000). 
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1. The Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Actions 
As part of the first issue in a claim of self-defense—the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions—evidence of the 
battered woman syndrome has been held by many states to be 
relevant to the reasonableness of a woman’s belief that she was in 
imminent danger of death or serious injury.210 Developed by Dr. 
Lenore Walker in 1979, the battered woman syndrome was 
conceived as a behavioral condition that arose out of prolonged 
exposure to an ongoing three-stage cycle of abuse: the “tension-
building” phase that includes verbal and psychological abuse in 
conjunction with less extreme physical abuse; the “acute battering 
incident” stage in which uncontrolled battering occurs; and the 
“loving contrition” phase in which the battering man expresses 
remorse and attempts reconciliation.211 Walker proposed that the 
unpredictability and intermittency of the battering cycle have long-
term effects on a “battered woman.”212 To explain why some 
                                                          
210 “[A] person is justified in using force to protect himself if he 
subjectively believes, and has objectively reasonable grounds for believing, that 
such force is necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack, even if 
appearances prove to be false” DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 
222. The purpose of evidence of the battered woman syndrome is to “explain to 
jurors why the defendant subjectively believed that the decedent was about to 
kill her (when he may have been asleep or otherwise passive); and to 
demonstrate that this belief was objectively reasonable to a person suffering 
from the syndrome.” Id. at 242. In some cases, women who kill battering men 
may raise the defense of Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance (EMED) to 
the charge of murder and be found guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
Id. at 541-43 (noting the subjective component of the defense (the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance) and the objective component (a reasonable 
explanation or excuse for the EMED)). 
211 LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-96 (1984) 
[hereinafter WALKER, SYNDROME]; see also LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, WOMAN]; LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING 
LOVE (1989). 
212 Walker defined a “battered woman” as a woman “in an intimate 
relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects . . . her to forceful physical 
and/or psychological abuse.” WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 211, at 203 
(defining “abuse” in six ways, from life-threatening violence to “extreme verbal 
harassment and expressing comments of a derogatory nature with negative value 
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women do not leave battering relationships, Walker applied the 
psychological construct of “learned helplessness.”213 
Judicial reception of the battered woman syndrome has 
reformed the law of domestic violence.214 While applauding the 
progress that has been wrung from Walker’s work, particularly 
expanding the base of relevant evidence, a number of critics have 
taken issue with the battered woman syndrome and the principle of 
learned helplessness.215 For example, the battered woman 
                                                          
judgments.”). 
213 The psychological theory of learned helplessness was developed by 
Martin Seligman based on laboratory experiments conducted on caged dogs who 
were given random electrical shocks and who eventually became passive and 
refused to leave their cages even when it became possible for them to do so. See 
WALKER, WOMAN, supra note 211, at 45-48 (discussing Seligman’s theory); see 
also Martin Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968). Walker applied Seligman’s theory of 
learned helplessness to women who had been battered, noting that when women 
“are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception becomes reality and 
they become passive, submissive, ‘‘helpless.’” Id. at 48; see also Mahoney, 
supra note 17, at 38-43 (observing that learned helplessness is described by 
courts “with varying degrees of sophistication as a deficiency in perceiving 
escape possibilities or a psychological adjustment to economic dependence, 
love, and the failure of the legal system to respond adequately to the problem.”). 
214 “The clear trend is to permit syndrome evidence in cases of 
confrontational homicides . . ., assuming that the defendant presents evidence of 
a history of abuse. Courts are divided on how to deal with nonconfrontational 
cases.” DRESSLER, CRIMINAL, supra note 170, at 532. In a survey of 223 
homicide cases defended by women who were battered, Holly Maguigan 
calculated that seventy-five percent of the incidents involved confrontations, 
twenty percent were nonconfrontational (with four percent as contract killings, 
eight percent sleeping-man cases, and eight percent in which the defendant was 
the initial aggressor during a lull in the violence). Maguigan, supra note 18, at 
396-97 (also noting that five percent of the appellate opinions did not include a 
discussion of the factual basis of the offense). 
215 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 41-42 (opting not to discard “such a major 
tool in the effort to explain women’s experience in court, just because it has 
proved vulnerable to distortion in culture and law”); see also Meier, supra note 
17, at 1305-11 (recognizing the battered woman syndrome as a “watershed in 
social and legal understandings of domestic violence” and that the syndrome 
“has not always advanced justice for battered women.”); Alafair S. Burke, 
Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out 
of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C.L. REV. 211, 216 (2002) (arguing that the 
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syndrome has been characterized as creating a “narrow stereotype 
of the archetypal woman entitled to claim victimization.”216 
Women who deviate from the image of the “perfect victim,” 
including women who demonstrate capacity for action, aggression, 
or independence, continue to be convicted of murder and 
manslaughter for killing their abusers.217 Critics have noted that 
Walker’s findings (primarily based on the experiences of white, 
middle class women) pose particular problems for women of color 
and women who are poor.218 Juries may be especially unlikely to 
see African American women, who have long been depicted as 
strong and aggressive, as coming within the image of 
“helplessness.”219 
More significantly, perhaps, the syndrome has been challenged 
as pathologizing women who have been battered by reinforcing 
oppressive images of women as weak and crazy, rather than 
recognizing women as rational actors who acted reasonably to save 
their lives.220 Because the battered woman syndrome points to 
helplessness and incapacity to reason, it undermines the “logic of 
self-defense,” which is based on an ability to reason and to react 
when in danger.221 Consequently, the battered woman syndrome 
                                                          
battered woman syndrome “does nothing to jettison the faulty doctrinal rules 
that formed the impetus for the syndrome theory as a litigation strategy.”). 
216 Meier, supra note 17, at 1306. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1307 n.33; see also Theresa Raffaele Jefferson, Note, Toward a 
Black Feminist Jurisprudence, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263, 290 (1998) 
(relaying story of “Debra,” whose “identity as a Black lesbian problematized the 
battered woman’s syndrome defense.”). 
219 Id. One of the cultural images of African-American women is that of 
“mules uh de world.” PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 43 
(1991) (quoting from Nanny, an elderly African-American woman who was 
explaining the “place” of Black women to her granddaughter in ZORA NEALE 
HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 16 (1937)). 
220 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 4, 42 (proposing that the battered woman 
syndrome and explanations that emphasize “helplessness: can “perpetuate 
existing oppressive stereotypes of battered women.”); Burke, supra note 215, at 
218 (advocating a “rational actor approach” that recognizes battered women as 
autonomous and competent decision-makers and their necessary use of force as 
justified, not excused). 
221 Jill E. Adams, Unlocking Liberty: Is California’s Habeas Law the Key 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
674 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
may create an internal inconsistency that undermines proof of the 
first aspect of the claim of self-defense.222 
2. The Proportionality of the Force Employed 
The second question in a claim of self-defense, the 
proportionality of the force employed, poses an additional 
interpretive hurdle for women who kill battering men.223 Even 
women who use force in response to an immediate attack may be 
excluded from a narrow definition of self-defense because they use 
deadly force to respond to an attack that judges and juries do not 
see as posing a deadly threat.224 In many of these cases, the woman 
used deadly force when the battering man was threatening verbally 
or with his fists.225 One study found that, of 223 cases defended by 
women who killed battering men, only five percent of the cases 
involved the man’s use of a weapon other than his hands; in each 
                                                          
to Freeing Unjustly Imprisoned Battered Women?, 19 BERKELEY’ WOMEN’S 
L.J. 217, 224 (2004) (relaying critique of the battered woman syndrome as 
“signaling incapacity to employ reason” and citing DONALD ALEXANDER 
DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, 
AND THE LAW 6-7 (1996)); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 4 (contrasting feminist 
explanations of women acting rationally under oppression with a simpler version 
told through the lens of cultural stereotypes of women as too helpless or 
dysfunctional to take reasonable action); see also Burke, supra note 215, at 247 
(arguing that the syndrome fails to explain why a woman kills an abusive 
partner in a non-confrontational situation: “The heightened and prolonged fear, 
cognitive impairment, and submissiveness described by the syndrome theory are 
inconsistent with a sudden decision to act at all, let alone with deadly force.”). 
222 Meier, supra note 17, at 1314-22 (discussing newer psychological 
approaches—post traumatic stress disorder, “redefined” battered woman 
syndrome, and entrapment or social control theories—that explicitly take social 
context into account). 
223 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 222 (advising that “a 
person is never permitted to use deadly force to repel a nondeadly attack”). 
224 Developments, supra note 31, at 1577; see also Fischer, supra note 134, 
at 2120 (explaining that seemingly innocent gestures—a nose scratch, a look, a 
drawn line gesture—are part of patterns of domination and are properly 
interpreted as “threatening symbols” by a woman who lives with a battering 
man). 
225 Id. 
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case, the woman used a weapon.226 
3. The Defendant’s Duty to Retreat 
The third inquiry in self-defense, whether the defendant 
retreated to the greatest degree possible, sets up a normative 
faultline for women who have killed battering men. In particular, 
to require a woman to demonstrate that leaving the room was “not 
reasonably possible without increasing her own danger of death or 
great bodily harm” unfairly burdens her with disproving one of the 
great myths of intimate violence—that she could have left.227 
“Why didn’t she leave?” has plagued cases in which women claim 
self-defense in killing a battering man.228 The question is 
legitimated when the law frames her defense in terms of an 
implicit duty to retreat. 
By posing the “leaving question” in a jury instruction, the law 
establishes a normative assumption that exit is the appropriate 
response to violence and hides the strategies that women have 
engaged to avoid or stop the battering.229 The question wrongly 
                                                          
226 Maguigan, supra note 18, at 416 n.131; see also State v. Wanrow, 559 
P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (reversing murder conviction of a mother who killed a 
child sex offender because the jury instruction established an objective standard 
that implied that the case were to be judged as if it were an altercation between 
two men). 
The impression created—that a 5’4” woman with a cast on her leg 
and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a 
6’2” intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense . . . —
constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the 
context of this case, violates respondent’s right to equal protection of 
the law. 
Id.; see also Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. 
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393 (2003) (discussing the exclusion of Ms. 
Wanrow’s Native American heritage from her defense). 
227 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057 (Fla. 1999) (adopting interim 
jury instruction); see also Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal Cases (Castle 
Doctrine), 789 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 2000) (authorizing edited jury instruction). 
228 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1026 (characterizing the question of 
leaving as a “depressingly perennial inquiry”). 
229 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2136 (relaying data from a study that women 
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implies not only that leaving is possible, but also that it will bring 
safety.230 
Ignoring the reality of the dynamics of battering, the law 
sometimes overtly places on women who kill battering men the 
burden of proving that they could not retreat without increasing the 
danger of death or great bodily harm.231 With the case oriented 
around such a normative center, jurors will be invited to question 
why a defending woman could not undertake the “simple act” of 
leaving the room.232 Because a judge may not permit a full 
evidentiary exploration of the battering relationship, jurors may not 
have sufficient information to understand why leaving a room may 
be dangerous.233 
                                                          
who were battered tried an average of thirteen strategies to stop the violence); 
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 81 (proposing that separation assault affirms the 
difficulties of exiting and the rationality of a woman’s perception of the danger 
of exiting). 
230 Most women who live with battering men do leave at some point. 
Meier, supra note 17, at 1311 n.52. However, their leaving does not end the 
violence. Id. Violence often increases when a woman attempts to leave. 
Anderson, supra note 152, at 93 (offering results of a study showing that 
“women who leave suffer significantly more violence than women who never 
leave.”); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 64-65 (noting that “[a]t least half of women 
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by 
them.”). 
231 E.g., Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1057 (setting forth interim jury instruction 
that articulated a “duty to retreat to the extent reasonably possible without 
increasing [his / her] own danger of death or great bodily harm.”). 
232 Id. at 1044-49, 1054 (noting the key role of retreat in the closing 
arguments of the prosecuting attorney—”that the killing could not be considered 
justifiable homicide unless Weiand had exhausted every reasonable means to 
escape the danger”). 
233 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985 (noting that jurors typically have 
not been given the evidence needed to understand motivation, which is critical 
to making sense of domestic violence cases); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 43 
(arguing that “[e]videntiary rules and courtroom bias . . . continue to skew the 
image of women in the self-defense cases, and these cases continue to contribute 
to cultural images that in turn shape law.”). But see Maguigan, supra note 18, at 
383 (arguing that a survey of homicide cases defended by women who were 
battered did not support the assumption that existing legal definitions excluded 
judicial consideration of social context). 
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4. The Temporal Proximity or Imminence of the Danger 
The fourth consideration in the law of self-defense asks 
whether the defendant was responding to an imminent threat.234 
While it appears to be an “objective” standard (for example, the 
time lag between the threat and the response), imminence is 
actually a fuzzy concept that incorporates social norms about 
women’s relationships with men.235 That imminence has a 
mercurial nature is illustrated by the varying directions and 
proximities to which it points. In some cases, it asks whether 
danger is imminent; in others it asks whether the closer notion of a 
threat is imminent; in others it asks whether an attack, closer still, 
is imminent; in others it switches perspective and asks whether the 
harm to defendant or another is imminent; in still others it asks the 
defendant to assess whether a forcible felony is imminent.236 
Illustrating the shift in perspective from attacker to defendant is the 
Model Penal Code, which does not focus on the threat, but on the 
response of the defendant (as being “immediately necessary”).237 
                                                          
234 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 222 (advising that 
imminence is an aspect of the necessity component of self-defense). 
235 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1238, 1267; see also Rosen, supra 
note 20, at 381 (discussing imminence as a translator and inhibitor of necessity). 
236 E.g., Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(noting rules applicable to self-defense, including a demonstration by a 
defendant of circumstances causing a reasonable prudent person to believe that 
danger was imminent); Developments, supra note 31, at 1576 (advising that 
most jurisdictions permit force to be used to prevent imminent threat of unlawful 
physical force); Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal Cases (Castle Doctrine), 
789 So. 2d at 955 (predicating “defense of home” instruction on an attack); The 
Florida Bar Re: Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases, 477 So. 2d. 985, 999 
(Fla. 1985) (authorizing instructions for justifiable use of deadly force, including 
imminent death or great bodily harm and imminent commission of forcible 
felony). 
237 The Model Penal Code states: “[T]he use of force upon or toward 
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is 
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of 
unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” MODEL PENAL 
CODE ‘ 3.04(1) (1985). Two changes were made by the Model Penal Code to 
traditional self-defense theory: 1) not requiring that defendant’s belief be 
reasonable; and 2) focusing on defendant’s belief that the use of force is 
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Imminence absorbs meanings of immediacy, as well as 
mediacy.238 When viewed as “immediate,” imminence functions in 
lock-step with an incident-based notion of battering, erasing the 
context of a battering relationship.239 Furthermore, in separation 
assault, it is the separation itself which is being attacked, with 
assault taking place over a period of time.240 Consequently, when 
imminence is read as “immediate,” the consequences are 
devastating to women who have survived in a climate of pervasive 
battering.241 
The most insidious norms absorbed by imminence are those 
that reflect social views that women should leave battering 
relationships. When read into imminence, a standard is created 
that, in effect, requires women to leave, not just a confrontation, 
but a relationship before a confrontation takes place.242 In this 
sense, imminence functions as a pre-retreat rule.243 Requiring pre-
retreat is clearly specious, as no rule would stand that, for example, 
required a man to leave a bar before a fight broke out.244 Yet, even 
                                                          
immediately necessary. E-mail from Mark Summers, Professor of Law, Barry 
University School of Law, to Judith E. Koons, Associate Professor of Law, 
Barry University School of Law (Aug. 16, 2005, 5:18 PM EST) (on file with 
author). Due to these changes (adopting a wholly subjective standard and 
shifting the emphasis from the victim to the defendant), the Model Penal Codes 
definition of self-defense “more easily accommodates the domestic violence 
paradigm.” Id. 
238 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 84 (criticizing decisions that confuse 
imminence and immediacy); see also Hunter v. State, 687 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (defining imminent as “near at hand, mediate rather 
than immediate, close rather than touching,” quoting Linsley v. State, 101 So. 
273 (Fla. 1924)). 
239 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 972. 
240 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 65-66 (noting, too, that the attack on the 
separation usually is not recognized). 
241 Id. at 84. 
242 Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 37-38. 
243 Id. at 37 n.56. 
244 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1284 (stating that a “man who 
goes for the fiftieth time to the violent gang-bar is not deprived of his self-
defense claim because he ‘‘should have left’ before the violence erupted.”). 
Kimberly Rasley was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a 
twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence for use of a firearm in 
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where the law has rejected a de jure duty to retreat, jurors may be 
invited to consider, through the lens of imminence, whether the 
defendant had time to go out the door (or leave the relationship) 
before an incident of abuse took place.245 
The normative power of the law should support a woman’s 
right of self-defense, not mandating that she fit the reality of 
gender domination into an inhospitable legal framework.246 
Furthermore, the normative power of the law should establish the 
value of personal safety, rather than a fictional and dangerous act 
of retreat.247 Influencing all interactions between people, the law 
shapes the identities, goals, and actions of people.248 Establishing a 
duty for women to first attempt leaving, even a room, is teaching 
women to disregard their own safety. 
                                                          
commission of the offense of killing her abusive husband after he had pushed 
her violently into the bedroom wall, left the house, and returned shortly 
thereafter. Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
He came through a double-locked door and, despite her entreaties to stop, 
continued to advance toward her until she shot him 24 to 42 inches away. Id. at 
475. Although she stated the belief that, if she had not obtained and used the 
weapon, he would have beaten her to death, the court affirmed the conviction 
and sentence because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that she “had other reasonable options besides that of deadly force to 
avoid the danger posed by her husband’s advance, including retreat . . . .” Id. at 
475, 477. 
245 Id. at 1247, 1268; see also Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048-49 
(Fla. 1999) (quoting prosecutor’s closing argument: “She had to exhaust every 
reasonable means of escape prior to killing him. Did she do that? No. Did she 
use the phone that was two feet away? No. Did she go out the door where her 
baby was sitting next to? No.”). 
246 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 960, 962 (discussing “flawed 
paradigms” that structure the criminal justice system’s response to the harms 
suffered by women who live with battering men). 
247 Wheatcroft, supra note 146, at 559-60 (noting the policy decision made 
by non-retreat jurisdictions, “not with a cavalier disregard for the value of 
human life but, rather,” to protect the victim and enable her to use force 
necessary to save her life). 
248 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1018 n.315, 1019 (discussing how the 
law influences human behavior, interactions, and identity and assuming “a 
mutating, bi-directionally permeable border between law and society”); Nourse, 
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1293 (explaining that the “law constitutes us and 
our relationship to the political order.”). 
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While some women who live with battering men may be 
apprised of the danger of leaving, other women may not be aware 
that forms of leaving may place them at significant risk.249 In one 
study, half of the survivors of femicide attempts reported that they 
were “completely surprised by the attack.”250 One woman broke up 
with a “gentle giant” who had no history of abuse.251 After she 
agreed to meet with him as friends, he tied her up and beat her for 
twelve hours.252 In response to the assertion that “women should 
be more aware,” the woman asserted: “Excuse me. If there are no 
signs to you—no previous throwing, hitting, screaming—how are 
you supposed to know what’s going to happen?”253 
The precipitating event in most of these homicidal attacks was 
the attempt by women to end the relationships.254 According to one 
woman’s description: 
I sit on my bed and he looks and me and says, ‘So what you 
are telling me is that you do not love me anymore.’  I said, 
‘No.’  ‘You want me out of the house?’  I said, ‘I do.’  He 
says, ‘O.K., well then I am going to kill you.’  That is when 
he lunged at me.255 
Another woman who survived a femicide attempt stated: “I 
didn’t really realize what big trouble I was in until I was to the 
point of where I thought I was going to die.”256 The 
unpredictability, complexity, and variety of abuse reported by 
women support the premise that the law should not set a normative 
baseline of leaving, whether it be a room, residence, or 
                                                          
249 Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791. 
256 Id.; see also State v. Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522 (Idaho 1980) (recounting 
that the “defendant shot her husband after seeing a look in his eyes which she 
had seen only once before when he choked her to near insensibility.”); Waits, 
supra note 197, at 37 (discussing “the look” that Mary’s abusive husband would 
give her to exercise control). 
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relationship.257 
Although formally adopting a no-retreat stance, the Florida 
legislature also reinforced the standard of imminence, effectively 
instantiating a requirement of retreat. Retreat rules place many 
women in the position of negotiating for their safety. The law must 
recognize that safety is non-negotiable.258 
D. The Meanings: A Jurisprudence of Gendered Violence 
The final movement of the hermeneutic pauses on questions of 
meaning, purpose, and value. That interpretive turn will be made 
by evaluating the ways in which gendered violence is mapped onto 
dichotomies that are erected in the law. 
Americans are in the grips of a love affair with violence and 
guns.259 At the same time, narratives about crime—“emotional, 
contradictory, and bewildering”—occupy the center of U.S. 
politics.260 Violence is one of the common denominators of 
oppression.261 People whose lives are marked by oppression may 
live with the specter of random, unprovoked attacks that have no 
motive other than to harm a person out of a sense of fear or hatred 
of the oppressed group.262 Violence may be best characterized as a 
“social practice” that is anticipated to reoccur because violence is 
“always on the horizon of social imagination, even for those who 
do not perpetrate it.”263 Group violence is legitimated in American 
                                                          
257 Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 793 (cautioning clinicians against pushing 
women to leave abusive relationships before addressing safety issues). 
258 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2153 (citing empirical work from which 
advocates argue that women “should never have to negotiate for their physical 
safety.’). 
259 Fine, supra note 118, at 16. 
260 Id. 
261 Oppression has been defined as “the institutional constraint on self-
development.” YOUNG, supra note 130, at 37. Explicating a structural analysis 
of relations of power in society, Young identified five faces of oppression: 
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. 
Id. at 49-62. 
262 Id. at 61. 
263 Id. at 62. 
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society, in that it is tolerated, if not applauded.264 Those who 
perpetrate acts of oppressive violence may receive little to no 
punishment.265 In contrast, a violent act by a woman may touch a 
depth of horror that triggers sweeping retribution.266 
American culture is marked by three articulated sites of 
violence: street violence, in which the public space in some 
communities is dominated by the drug markets; “state-initiated 
violence,” in which communities of color criticize police 
harassment and the flight of jobs and capital from their 
communities; and domestic violence, in which women are 
terrorized in their homes by male partners.267 The widely varying 
accounts of the location of violence in communities by the race, 
                                                          
264 In a study of the life histories of 154 poor and working-class adults in 
Jersey City and Buffalo, one of the stories described the response of the police 
to a white man’s report of a break-in: “[O]ne cop said to me that it was too bad 
that you didn’t catch him inside the house because then you would have killed 
him and we wouldn’t have said anything.” Fine, supra note 118, at 8; see also 
DRESSLER, CRIMINAL supra note 170, at 526-27 (noting that the President 
declared in 2002 that we must be able to stop rogue states and terrorists before 
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction and questioning: “If 
so-called ‘preemptive self-defense’ is being conducted at the international level, 
is there any reason to deny the right to battered women to kill their ‘rogue’ and 
‘terrorist’ partners before they are able to threaten, much less use, deadly 
force?”). 
265 E.g., Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly 
Force: Policy and Practice, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 79, 103 (1993) (noting 
that law enforcement agencies “have not been vigilant in punishing officers who 
have repeatedly used excessive force” and citing the example of Miami officials 
sustaining 10 of 172 excessive force complaints between 1988 and 1991, 
resulting in one officer’s leaving the police force of 2,457 officers); see also 
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1275 (1999) (questioning why the story of police brutality is 
“anecdotalized” as unusual, an aberration). 
266 E.g., MORRISSEY, supra note 18 passim (critiquing portrayal of women 
killers as victims, sufferers of mental illness, and inhuman monsters and arguing 
that the portrayals deny human agency); see also Anne Taylor Fleming, Crime 
and Motherhood: Maternal Madness, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2002, at 4-3 
(discussing the capital murder conviction of Andrea Yates for the murder of her 
children and her depiction as “demon mother writ large” despite her mental 
illness). 
267 Fine, supra note 118, at 7. 
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gender, and class of respondents demonstrate that perceptions of 
violence in the United States are deeply raced, gendered and 
classed. In one study of crime and violence in two low-income 
urban communities, white men offered racialized narratives of 
street crime while African-American men and Latinos focused on 
state violence, detailing examples of disproportionate arrests of 
men of color and increased prison construction.268 White women 
offered scenes of pervasive male-perpetrated violence among 
family members while many African-American women and 
Latinas detailed incidents of home-based violence, street violence, 
and state-initiated violence, primarily in the welfare office.269 
As reflected in the strengthened castle doctrine and other crime 
bills, public policy emphasizes street crime, but has offered 
inadequate redress for domestic abuse, and has been silent on state 
abuse.270 A terrible gender irony for many women is that the home 
front is often more dangerous than the streets.271 However, in the 
United States, the policy answer for violence speaks from the 
privileged standpoint of elite white men.272 The experiences of 
white women and people of color are often relegated to the narrow, 
confusing, and contradictory margins of the law. 
Race, gender, and class fissures in the law find their heritage in 
Western philosophy. At the dawn of modernity, Enlightenment 
thinkers structured their thought around binaries—reason / passion, 
mind / body, and public / private.273 A key construct underlying 
                                                          
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 15 (offering this narrative by a Latina describing efforts to get the 
police to respond: “You call 911 and say, ‘‘Okay, I’m calling from such and 
such a building. There’s kids hanging outside. It’s 3 o’clock in the morning. I 
can’t sleep.’ The cops won’t come. They won’t come. They will never show up. 
Or, there’s a domestic fight in apartment such and such. You’ll sit there and die 
before they come. I mean the wife will be dead, and he’ll beat her to death 
before the cops ever come.”). 
270 Id. at 8, 18. 
271 Id. at 6 (observing that “[f]or poor and working-class men and women, 
life on the streets may be tough. But for women, life may be tougher still at 
home.”). 
272 Id. at 8, 18. 
273 The Enlightenment brought the dawning of modernity, that enormous 
change in European thought dating from the mid-sixteenth century which 
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Western philosophy and science is the subject / object binary.274 In 
this worldview, the subject is panoptically centered while all who 
are “different” are viewed as “other” and marginalized.275 The 
process of “othering” is hierarchical, in that the other is marked, 
subordinated, and rendered invisible.276 
                                                          
rejected the dogma and substantive rationality of religious and metaphysical 
world-views. ELISABETH SCHÜSSLER FIORENZA, RHETORIC AND ETHIC 35 
(1999) (defining modernity in terms of procedural rationality which gives 
credence to objective knowledge, moral practical insight, and aesthetic judgment 
and defining postmodernity as critical thought based on its modern predecessor, 
but posing three correctives—aesthetic (experiential concreteness and intuitive 
imagination are stressed over rationalist abstraction), cultural (cultural autonomy 
and the wisdom of particular community are emphasized over universalization), 
and political (power is seen as the starting point, not reason). With many of the 
Enlightenment thinkers, reason was associated with the male, while passion / 
disorder / nature were associated with the female. E.g., GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE 
MAN OF REASON 77 (2d ed. 1993) (evaluating the “maleness of Reason” in the 
thought of such philosophers as Jean Jacques Rousseau by explicating his view 
that the “disorder of women” was a “threat to the public life of citizenship” and 
served as a rationale for women’s exclusion from citizenship). 
274 YOUNG, supra note 130, at 99, 126, 147. 
275 Id. at 99, 147 (noting, too, that there is only one subject position). 
Simone de Beauvoir conceived the “Other” in 1949 as the metaphor by which 
women have been set aside and subordinated in a discourse constructed to 
protect the interests of privileged White men. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE 
SECOND SEX (1949); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 158 
(1992) (presenting conceptions of self as the “generalized” and “concrete” 
other). 
276 Euro-English language is shot through with binaries that are hierarchical 
dyads—right / wrong, tall / short, fast / slow, good / bad, happy / unhappy—with 
preferred and disfavored polarities. MARY BELENKY ET AL., A TRADITION THAT 
HAS NO NAME: NURTURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE, FAMILIES, AND 
COMMUNITIES 21 (1997) (featuring the work of psychologists and linguists to 
explain the gendered nature of the binaries that constitute our 
language).Linguists found that, with each binary, there is a pole that is 
“unmarked” and a pole that is “marked.” Id. The positive or unmarked pole 
denotes the entire scale and is associated with men, while the marked pole only 
refers to the negative end of the pole and is associated with women. Id. The 
unmarked pole, reserved for men, is the favored dyad, while the marked pole is 
tainted with “girl stain.” Id. “Mankind” is an unmarked term and operates to 
identify men as well as all of humanity. Id. at 22. “Womankind” is marked and, 
because of the taint of gender, is too polluting to include men. Id. Male language 
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In Western philosophy, the other serves as the object for the 
subject.277 When human beings become objects, violence against 
them is justified: “Underlying all violence is a human being that 
has been reduced to the status of an object.”278 Consequently, the 
binarist structure of law and philosophy, with the paradigmatic 
centering of the elite white male subject and the othering of 
subordinated people, serves as the structural basis of race, gender, 
and class violence. 
The public / private binary is also a key feature in the 
landscape of domestic violence and the law. In the mid-1700s, 
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau gave primacy 
to a gendered division between public and private spheres.279 Also 
conceptualizing distinctions between reason and nature, Rousseau 
considered the closeness of women to nature and passion to justify 
their exclusion from citizenship.280 The “disorder of women” 
served as a threat to public citizenship.281 Rousseau solved the 
riddle by making men good citizens in the public sphere while 
locating women as good persons in the private domain.282 Linking 
the spheres, Rousseau viewed the private domain as “the nursery” 
in which women would raise good citizens who would animate 
                                                          
that is offered as “generic” is actually linguistically coded language that 
represents the interests of men. Id.; see also YOUNG, supra note 130, at 59 
(describing the paradox of cultural imperialism is that it not only marks out 
certain groups, it also renders the groups invisible). 
277 YOUNG, supra note 130, at 136. 
278 Fr. John Kavanaugh, Challenging a Commodity Culture, COMMONWEAL 
606, 608 (Nov. 1984) (proposing that alternatives to the hegemony of 
commodification must be lived in a full dialectic that embraces interiority, 
relationships, social commitments, simplicity, and compassion). 
279 LLOYD, supra note 273, at 78 (noting, in Rousseau’s thought, the 
“complementarity between male and female character is mapped onto the 
public-private distinction”); see also Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the 
Public / Private Dichotomy, in THE DISORDER OF WOMEN 118, 118-40 (1989) 
(critiquing the patriarchal character of liberalism and tracing the liberal 
theoretical division between the public and private to JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689)). 
280 LLOYD, supra note 273, at 77. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
686 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
public life.283 
Wife abuse in the private sphere was condoned at common 
law.284 Blackstone advised: 
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife 
moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her 
misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him 
with this power of restraining her, by domestic 
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed 
to correct his servants or children.285 
In the United States, the “discourse of affectional privacy” 
undergirded the refusal of courts to interfere with a husband’s 
moderate correction of his wife.286 Affirming the trial court’s 
decision that a man who whipped his wife with a switch was not 
guilty of battery as a matter of law, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reasoned that it would not disturb “family government in 
trifling cases” because: 
[H]owever great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and 
even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they 
are not comparable with the evils which would result from 
raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and 
criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber.287 
                                                          
283 Id.at 77-78. 
284 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 969. 
285 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 1:432 (also asserting: “But, with us, in 
the politer reign of Charles the second, this power of correction began to be 
doubted . . . . Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old 
common law, still claim and exert their antient privilege: and the courts of law 
will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross 
misbehaviour.”); see also Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage 
Law From 1750, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 53 (2001) (debunking 
as a “myth” that the right of moderate correction included the “rule of thumb,” 
whereby a husband could beat his wife with a stick as long as its diameter was 
no thicker than his thumb and noting the possible origins of this legend in a 
statement made by Sir Francis Buller in 1792, for which he was excoriated). 
286 Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wifebeating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996). 
287 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457 (N.C. 1868) (questioning, too, what 
standards of provocation would be appropriate for the “hovel,” the middle class, 
and the “higher ranks.”); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A 
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The split between the public and private domains was squarely 
challenged by second wave feminists in their charge that the 
“personal is political.”288 The woman’s movement made public 
issues out of practices—including domestic violence—that had 
been considered too private or trivial for political and public 
discussion.289 Due to contemporary public policies that effect 
broad cutbacks for people who are poor, commentators have 
suggested that women are being “swept into the corners of a 
reinstitutionalized ‘private’ sphere” without adequate resources.290 
These critics also forecast that, with the shrinking of the public 
sphere, “women will get beaten with more regularity, with fewer 
options and more muzzled critiques.”291 
Violence against women in their homes continues to have 
legitimacy due to a gendered division between the public and the 
private spheres. One study posited that, as men in low-income 
urban communities lost economic power due to the shrinkage of 
public sector and unionized jobs, they attempted to assert power in 
                                                          
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (noting that “[a] majority 
of states still retain some form of the common law regime” that exempts 
husbands from prosecution for raping their wives: “They criminalize a narrower 
range of offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital rape they do 
recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for 
marital rape prosecutions.”). 
288 YOUNG, supra note 130, at 120. COLLINS, supra note 219, at 47 
(observing that women of color have “never fit” the model of the dichotomous 
split between work (public) and family (private)). The slogan, “the personal is 
political,” was coined by Carol Hanisch in a duplex on N.W. 3rd Place in 
Gainesville, Florida, in March of 1968. Carol Giardina, Action Knowledges: 
Radical Feminism in Gainesville, Florida, 1964-89, Address at the “Cultivating 
Knowledges” Twenty-fifth Anniversary Symposium of the Center for Women’s 
Studies and Gender Research at the University of Florida (Oct. 26, 2002) (notes 
on file with the author) (noting, too, that the phrase was related to the work of 
Beverly Jones and Judith Benninger Brown, whose paper, Toward a Female 
Liberation Movement, was published in the spring of 1968). 
289 YOUNG, supra note 130, at 120. 
290 Fine, supra note 118, at 10. 
291 Id. (also forecasting that women will be held in the violence of the 
private sphere “by the hollowing of the economy and the retreat of public sector 
services for women and children.”). 
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the domestic sphere.292 Stories told by these men were stories of 
loss—the loss of privilege—that were situated in a discourse of 
property rights.293 
The obsession of Americans with private property rights adds 
another layer of “justification” to gendered intimate violence. 
Cases that uphold the duty to retreat for cohabitors are often based 
squarely on the primacy of property rights.294 Placing property 
rights over personal safety has absurd and deadly consequences. In 
one case, a man described as a “withdrawn workaholic” had 
moved out of the marital home but then began stalking his wife, 
leading to the following incident: 
One night he went through her home with a sledgehammer, 
chainsaw, and toxic chemicals, destroying everything the 
family owned. Though neighbors called the police, the 
police felt they could not intervene as he was an owner of 
the house and there was no restraining order against him. 
The next morning, he was waiting for her in the house with 
a loaded crossbow.295 
Sheltered by the rhetoric of private property, de jure and de 
facto duties to retreat serve to insulate intimate male violence from 
legal accountability.296 
CONCLUSION 
For many women who defend themselves in their homes and in 
the courts, the law supports and conceals an elaborate system of 
domination, subordination, and control.297 While this system is 
                                                          
292 Id. at 8; see also DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 112, at 1, 5 
(reporting that, while domestic violence is statistically consistent across racial 
and ethnic categories, “past and current victims of domestic violence are over-
represented” among women who receive welfare). 
293 Fine, supra note 118, at 8. 
294 Carpenter, supra note 3 passim. 
295 Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791 (emphasis supplied). 
296 Cf. Balos, supra note at 193, 105 (arguing that it is “time for the 
doctrine of privacy to stop sheltering perpetrators of sexual harassment in the 
home.”). 
297 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985. 
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veiled by race, class, and gender privilege in a discourse that 
naturalizes oppression, occasionally an adjustment in the law 
creates a shift that allows observers to catch a glimpse of deep 
structural flaws in legal doctrines.298 The recent shifts in the retreat 
and castle doctrines provide a vantage point for observing the legal 
construction of relations of subordination and domination for 
women, battering men, and the legal system.299 
By way of Potter’s Boxes, this article has traveled into the 
rupture between some of the controlling legal doctrines and the 
experiences of many women who live with battering men.300 To 
examine the facts of battering, the article has noted the 
pervasiveness of physical and non-physical abuse of women by 
intimate male partners. The article challenges the factual basis for 
duties to retreat by juxtaposing them with the well-known 
phenomenon of separation assault, by which patterns of violence 
escalate upon a decision, threat, or move to separate from an 
abuser.301 
To explore the domain of loyalties, the article has illustrated 
that, while battering is experienced as part of a complex system of 
domination and control, the law may be structurally disabled from 
hearing the truth of the relational dynamics of battering. Instead, 
the law often decontextualizes “episodic physical violence from 
the battering relationship.”302 Jurors may be deprived of 
information necessary to form a coherent and reasonable story of 
self-defense.303 Relationships on the interpersonal, as well as the 
                                                          
298 Cf. id. at 988 (noting “adjustments” that have taken place in the law 
regarding domestic violence: “Yet law’s adjustments have, to this point, been 
marginal: at times doctrinally incoherent; in places theoretically untenable; in 
other places practically unworkable; always providing less than a remedy for the 
true harm of domestic violence.”). 
299 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1275 (discussing the relationships 
implicated in every criminal law defense— “the relationship between the 
defendant and the victim and the relationship between the defendant and the 
state.”). 
300 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 961 (exploring the “rupture” between 
battering, as experienced by women, and the remedies offered by criminal law). 
301 E.g., Mahoney, supra note 17 passim. 
302 Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985. 
303 Id. (arguing that a jury cannot understand what motivates the 
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community and state levels, often drive the fate of women who live 
with battering men. Little accountability seems to be taken by 
communities for failing to protect or provide resources for women 
who live with battering men.  Nor does the state answer for the 
failings of the criminal justice system, including creating and 
imposing legal doctrines that castigate and punish women for 
rational choices made in battering relationships.304 
In the normative domain, the article notes that the elements of 
self-defense for women who kill battering men are all but 
impossible to prove. Self-defense is structured by the 
considerations of reasonableness, proportionality, retreat, and 
imminence.305 Woven into the battered woman syndrome is the 
trope of learned helplessness, undermining the “logic of self-
defense” by which a woman is judged by her capacity to react 
rationally when in danger.306 Narrow interpretations of 
proportionality interfere with jurors and judges being able to 
apprehend the seriousness of the threat to a woman who lives with 
a battering man. A look or gesture, in the context of the hostage-
taking that aptly describes the battering relationship, may be as 
dangerous as a loaded gun.307 
Moreover, overt and covert retreat rules legitimize the 
normative imperative that a woman prove inability to leave a 
room, a residence, or a relationship in order to support a claim of 
self-defense.308 Requiring retreat as a normative baseline robs 
                                                          
defendant’s actions without apprehending the system of subordination and 
control that the law is masking). 
304 Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Reforms: Reactions From the 
Trenches, 29 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71 (2002) (reporting on client reactions 
to legal and policy reforms in the handling of domestic violence cases in the 
criminal justice system as decidedly mixed. Clients, particularly, do not for the 
most part see the criminal justice system as a solution to their problems). 
305 Maguigan, supra note 18, at 385; see also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 28, at 221 (noting the necessity, proportionality, and reasonable-
belief components of self-defense). 
306 Adams, supra note 221, at 224. 
307 Fischer, supra note 134, at 2120 (describing seemingly innocent 
gestures as “threatening symbols” in the context of a battering relationship). 
308 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048-49 (Fla. 1999) (relaying 
prosecutor’s argument that emphasized a failure to retreat). 
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women of their first right to safety.309 The standard of imminence 
functions as a retreat rule by borrowing prevailing social norms, 
including the key unspoken norm that women leave battering 
relationships.310 In this sense, imminence functions as a pre-retreat 
rule, a standard that is not discursively tolerated in any 
jurisdiction.311 States, such as Florida, that reject duties to retreat, 
have effectively adopted a norm of retreat under the cloudy 
concept of imminence. 
Giving content to controlling legal norms are norms of relation 
and property that disadvantage women.312 The retrofitted castle 
doctrine may appear to be gender-neutral. However, an 
examination of the interplay among facts, relationships, norms, and 
meaning has illustrated that the legal doctrines by which women 
who kill battering men are judged are not neutral standards, but are 
infused with meaning about “fitting” relationships between men 
and women.313 In other words, they are about power.314 Because 
gender is part of a “stratification system” that gives unequal 
statuses to men and women, the gender social norms that are 
absorbed into the law are hostile to women.315 
                                                          
309 Wheatcroft, supra note 146, at 554 (arguing that a retreat rule 
“inexcusably burdens battered persons by forcing them to attempt dangerous 
escapes, to risk bodily harm at the hands of their batterers, or to face lengthy 
prison terms for acting to protect their lives.”). 
310 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1280-82. 
311 Id. at 1284-85. 
312 Id. at 1287; see also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 685, 689 (exposing the 
roles of property and sanctuary in the cohabitor exception to the castle doctrine). 
313 Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39 (observing that the rule of 
imminence, due to the social norms it absorbs, replays a relation of inferiority of 
women to men). 
314 Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1299 (proposing that the debate 
over subjectivity in criminal law is really about “the politics of criminal law 
scholarship.”). 
315 Lorber, supra note 108, at 40 (describing the social institution of gender 
as a process of creating social statuses, as a part of a stratification system that 
ranks men and women, and as an organizing structure that divides work and 
legitimates those in authority ); Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39 
(explaining that, while imminence is not motivated by hostility toward women, 
the discrimination is one of relation that “reenacts a relation of inferiority and 
invisibility.”). 
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To examine the jurisprudential dimensions of the disconnect 
between the law and the experience of battering, the article points 
to the binarist structure of law and philosophy as creating positions 
of subordination and privilege that support violence toward women 
and that release abusive men from accountability. The subject / 
object binary operates as a philosophical template that objectifies 
women and, consequently, justifies the violence that is turned 
toward women and other “others.”316 The public / private binary 
attempts to sequester women in the private sphere, where private 
property rights often trump personal safety.317 
Ultimately, the article argues that, as a consequence of the 
retreat and imminence doctrines, the safety of many women who 
live with battering men is discounted. At the same time, greater 
safety and legal protections for many men are bolstered by 
measures such as the enhanced castle doctrine that reflects 
prevailing norms of domination, privilege, mobility, and autonomy 
in the public domain.318 
In one episode of Gunsmoke, Miss Kitty shot a man who 
abducted her and another woman.319 In the final scene, Kitty fell 
into the arms of Marshall Matt Dillon, exclaiming, “I guess you 
can do what you have to.”320 The present-day sequel to that 
episode, imagined in this article, asks whether the lawman really 
understood her claim of self-defense. Or will Miss Kitty find 
herself an inmate of the Dodge City jail and have to struggle for 
                                                          
316 Kavanaugh, supra note 278, at 608; DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 275; see 
also Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in 
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 117 (1984) (advising that when white 
women “ignore their built-in privilege of whiteness and define woman in terms 
of their own experience alone, then women of Color become ‘‘other,’ the 
outsider whose experience and tradition is too ‘‘alien’ to comprehend.”). 
317 Carpenter, supra note 3, at 689 (noting disturbing issues where 
possessory interests are elevated to trump personal rights of protection in the 
sanctuary). 
318 Cf. Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39 (discussing the 
absorption of social norms and relations of inferiority into the rule of 
imminence). 
319 Gunsmoke: Help Me Kitty (Nov. 7, 1964) (episode guide), at 
http://www.tv.com/gunsmoke/help-me-kitty/episode/41248/summary.html. 
320 Id. 
KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:34 PM 
 INTIMATE BATTERY AND THE LAW 693 
her life, a second time, in the frontier justice system? 
 
